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ABSTRACT 
I investigate how nonprofessional investors’ confidence in the financial statements and 
the audit report is influenced by the firm specific details of a critical audit matter (CAM) 
disclosure in conjunction with the description of the audit procedures engaged to address the 
CAM in the audit report.  Using participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk as a proxy 
for nonprofessional investors in a 2x2 +1 (control) between-participants experiment 
manipulating CAM disclosure detail (Detailed/Generic) and the description of the audit 
procedures engaged to address the CAM (Detail/Generic) I find that greater detail in the 
description of the CAM results in higher confidence in the accuracy and reliability of the 
financial statements than a generic description of the CAM, consistent with boundary condition 
of Support Theory.  Further, I find that greater detail in the description of the related audit 
procedures engaged to address the CAM increases nonprofessional investors’ perceptions of 
audit quality.  Evidence of an effect of CAM and audit procedure disclosure language on 
investment judgments is also presented.  These results have implications for researchers, 
practitioners, and regulators to carefully consider the language used to disclose CAMs in the 
auditor’s report. 
Keywords: Critical Audit Matters, Standard Audit Report, Nonprofessional Investors’ 
Perception, Audit Quality, Support Theory, PCAOB 
Data availability: Contact the author
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has recently proposed new 
rules for auditors of U.S. issuers that will mandate the disclosure in the audit report of critical 
audit matters (CAMs) which are those issues identified during the audit that required the 
auditor’s significant judgment (PCAOB 2016).  The goal of the PCAOB’s standard setting 
process is to address the lamented lack of content in the auditor’s report highlighted by Church et 
al. (2008).  Church et al. (2008) concluded from their review that the audit report possesses 
symbolic value but does a poor job of communicating useful information to financial statement 
users.   
Contemporary research has investigated how jurors, legal experts, and analysts view the 
disclosure of CAMs in light of litigation against the auditor (Backof et al. 2015, Bedard et al. 
2015, Brown et al. 2014, Gimbar et al. 2016, Kachelmeier et al. 2016, Kadous et al. 2015) and 
has generally found that the disclosure of a CAM leads to a “disclaimer effect” (Heymann 2010).  
The findings suggest that a CAM disclosure serves as a warning that the user of the financial 
statements should carefully consider what they are about to consume from the financial reports.  
This is despite the auditor providing reasonable assurance on the financial statements as a whole.  
Other experimental research has shown that the presence of a CAM in the audit report 
discourages investment in the firm (Christensen et al. 2014) or have found no effect on 
participants’ investment decisions (Carver and Trinkle 2016).   
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Despite this prior research, little evidence exists illustrating how the language1 (e.g. firm 
specific factors, language valence, granularity of description, etc.) with which a CAM is 
disclosed in the audit report influences nonprofessional investors’ confidence in the underlying 
figures.  This is an important question to investigate given the PCAOB’s election of a principles-
based framework for the auditor to accomplish their new mandate.  This principles based 
framework suggests that the auditor may disclose any level of detail they deem appropriate as 
long as they fulfill four obligatory disclosures.   
A second dimension of the PCAOB’s proposed standard unaddressed in prior research is 
the mandatory disclosure of the auditor’s response to the CAM.  This novel regulation would 
give the users of financial statements insight into the audit procedures performed to attain 
assurance on the assertions underlying the account in question.  This would include information 
that the investing public has not been privy to before.  As stated in the PCAOB’s re-proposed 
rule, the communication of a critical audit matter would include: 1) identifying the critical audit 
matter, 2) describing the principal considerations that led the auditor to determine that the matter 
is a critical audit matter, 3) describing how the CAM was addressed in the audit, and 4) referring 
to the relevant financial statements accounts and disclosures (PCAOB 2016, Page 13).   
Despite these regulatory proposals, the PCAOB explicitly states that assurance provided 
on the financial statements should remain at the same level as before and piecemeal assurance, 
                                                          
 
1 This dearth of research is unsurprising considering the standard audit report has remained boilerplate and 
unchanged in its informational content since SAS No. 58 (AICPA 1988a).  The PCAOB’s re-proposed regulation 
opens up significant research opportunities into the language of the audit report on how different language 
characteristics and detail could have a differential effect on investor judgments and investment decisions.  
Anecdotally, audit reports of issuers in the U.K. vary considerably in the depth of content and description of key 
audit matters (KAMs).  The Financial Reporting Council encourages auditors to add their own observations and to 
be as descriptive as possible in their KAM disclosure (FRC 2013).  The PCAOB itself states that the FRC 
requirements are used for comparison to its own standard setting process for the CAM initiative (PCAOB 2016, 
Page 11).  
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nor language suggestive thereof, will not be tolerated in the auditor’s report. Actual audit quality 
remains unobservable; therefore, perceptions of audit quality inform individuals’ view of reality 
and impact their judgments and decisions (Smith and Minter 2005).  The upcoming changes to 
the regulatory environment highlight the importance of research in this area to determine how the 
new disclosures will be impact the perceptions of audit and financial reporting quality of 
different investing populations, including nonprofessional investors.  In light of these new 
regulatory developments, it is important to determine how nonprofessional investors perceive the 
manner in which a CAM is disclosed along with the audit procedures engaged to address the 
CAM.   
This study examines the following research questions: 1) how does the PCAOB’s 
principles-based framework for the communication of CAMs, specifically the level of detail used 
to describe the CAM disclosure, impact nonprofessional investors’ confidence in the accuracy 
and reliability of the financial statements as a whole, 2) how does the description of the related 
audit procedures in the audit report moderate nonprofessional investors’ assessments of audit 
quality, 3) do these two disclosures interact to jointly impact nonprofessional investors’ 
confidence in the financial statements and assessments of audit quality, 4) are nonprofessional 
investors’ assessments of misstatement influenced by the new disclosure, and 5) how are 
nonprofessional investors’ investment decisions impacted by the changes to the standard audit 
report? 
This research is important because, despite the additional disclosure of CAMs and audit 
procedures in the audit report, the level of assurance provided on financial statements will 
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remain the same and the new proposal does not require additional audit testing or procedures 
beyond what is already being completed on the audit engagement2.  The only factor that could be 
influenced by these additional disclosures is perceptions of audit quality and perceptions of 
financial reporting quality.  Currently, little evidence exists indicating how investors will utilize 
an expanded audit report3 consisting of CAM disclosures and the related audit procedures when 
evaluating the financial statements of investment prospects and whether their perceptions of 
audit quality and confidence in the financial statements will be impacted.  This research 
contributes to the literature by investigating under what circumstances the details of a CAM 
disclosure in conjunction with the detail of the related audit procedures specific to the firm 
influences nonprofessional investors’ confidence in the financial statements and the auditor’s 
work.  
The information required to answer these questions is not available in existing archival 
datasets in the United States4; therefore, the effect of CAM disclosure and audit procedure 
                                                          
 
2 Specifically, the PCAOB states in their re-proposed rule that “the reproposed standard is intended to respond to 
investor requests for additional information about the financial statement audit by increasing the relevance and 
usefulness of the auditor’s report, without imposing requirements beyond the auditor’s expertise or mandate.” 
(PCAOB 2016, Page 2).  This statement suggests that the only area of additional compliance for the auditor would 
be the disclosure requirements laid out in the standard and no additional testing or evidence collection would be 
required beyond what is presently expected of the auditor. 
3 Two contemporaneous studies investigate similar research questions.  Sirois et al (2014) employs eye-tracking 
technology to investigate how users of the auditor’s report navigate through the additional key audit matter (KAM) 
disclosures.  Carver and Trinkle (2016) study how the proposed standard impacts nonprofessional investors’ 
valuation judgments and find that the inclusion of a CAM does not impact valuation judgments.  I expand upon 
these previous studies by investigating how the principles-based framework laid out by the PCAOB in their re-
proposed rule could communicate identical CAM accounts to investors with variable levels of detail.  This variable 
level of detail could result in differential judgments of perceived audit quality and perceived financial reporting 
quality, impacting investment decisions. 
4 As will be discussed later, several international jurisdictions have mandated disclosures synonymous with the 
PCAOB’s CAMs.  The Financial Reporting Council in the United Kingdom has mandated the external audit disclose 
Key Audit Matters (KAMs) in their audit reports (FRC 2013).  The revised standard requires the auditor’s report to 
disclose a description of risks of material misstatement and how the audit addressed each of these risks.  The format 
of these disclosures in the audit reports differ significantly from firm to firm and auditor to auditor.   By conducting 
an experiment with nonprofessional investors trained in U.S. GAAP and familiar with U.S. laws and regulations as 
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disclosure on nonprofessional investors’ confidence in the results of the audit and the contents of 
financial statements may only be obtained experimentally.  The findings will be of interest to 
researchers, practitioners, and regulators as the PCAOB develops this standard in determining 
what expanded audit report disclosures are most valuable to nonprofessional investors in 
informing their confidence in the underlying accounts and the audit.  Practitioners will be 
interested in how the different paths the auditor may use to comply with their new mandate can 
differentially impact nonprofessional investors’ judgments and investment decisions.  Company 
management will be interested in the results if the language chosen by the auditor to disclosure 
CAMs impacts nonprofessional investors’ investing decisions, thereby giving management an 
incentive to influence the disclosure process and the language contained therein. 
To investigate my research questions, I conduct a 2 x 2 + 1 (control) between-participants 
experiment using participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk as a proxy for 
nonprofessional investors5.  The independent variables manipulated include the detail of a 
critical audit matter disclosure in the audit report at two levels (Detailed/Generic) and the 
description of the audit procedures engaged to address the CAM at two levels 
(Detailed/Generic).  Participants were asked to view summary financial information regarding 
two fictitious financial service firms and were then exposed to the experimental manipulation in 
a summarized auditor’s report.  My dependent variable measures included: confidence in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
participants, I am able to observe a clearer portrait of how these disclosures would influence nonprofessional 
investors active in U.S. equity markets.  Further, I am able to tease out granular features of the re-proposed rule to 
determine what new disclosures will impact nonprofessional investors’ judgments and how the features interact with 
one another to impact nonprofessional investors’ judgments. 
5 Amazon Mechanical Turk is a digital labor marketplace where workers voluntary review Human Intelligence 
Tasks (HITS) to determine whether or not to participate for compensation.  Prior research in accounting has utilized 
participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk as a proxy for nonprofessional investors (e.g. Rennekamp 2012, 
Brown et al. 2014, and Brasel et al. 2016.  Additional research by Farrell et al. (2017) shows that participants 
recruited from the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform as at least as honest and exert similar levels of effort to 
participants used in prior research to proxy for nonprofessional investors.  
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accuracy of the account disclosed as a CAM, confidence in the accuracy of the financial 
statements as a whole, assessments of auditor competence and audit quality, likelihood of 
material misstatement, and an investment decision between the two competing firms.  The audit 
report of the control condition only contains a statement that no CAMs were identified or 
disclosed in the current engagement and does not contain a manipulated audit report for 
comparative purposes. 
For this research, I rely upon theory from psychology to motivate my investigation and 
hypotheses.  Specifically, I utilize literature from Support Theory.  Support Theory (Tversky and 
Koehler 1994, Rottenstreich and Tversky 1997, Sloman et al. 2004) suggests that an individual 
does not assess the probability of an event directly, but assesses the support for the underlying 
hypothesis or description of the event.  In my experimental context, when an event (CAM 
disclosure) is described in greater detail and specificity, such as listing the specific 
considerations that led to the determination of a CAM or the details of the audit procedures 
engaged to address the CAM, a nonprofessional investor will assess the probability of the event 
(e.g. unreliable/inaccurate account in the case of a CAM, higher/lower audit quality in the case of 
the related audit procedures) as more likely to occur.  This phenomenon is due to the individual’s 
(e.g. nonprofessional investor) effortful evaluation of the separate pieces of evidence and details 
surrounding the event rather than judging the probability of the event itself6.  In other words, as 
greater detail is provided to the individual (nonprofessional investor) regarding the event, he will 
                                                          
 
6 An easily accessible of Support Theory may be found in Tversky and Koehler (1994).  In their experiment, 
Tversky and Koehler (1994) asked participants to evaluate the probability of death by natural causes and unnatural 
causes, two mutually exclusive hypotheses.  Participants evaluated the probability of each hypothesis as 58% and 
32%, respectively.  The experimenters then asked participants to evaluate the probability of death due to heart 
disease, cancer, or other natural causes (which are all subsets of death by natural causes); the probabilities for each 
of the subsets were 22%, 18% and 33% which summed to 73%, a significantly higher probability assessment than 
58%. 
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assess the probability of the event to be higher than if generic details were provided in the 
description. 
Support Theory is subject to a boundary condition; as demonstrated in Sloman et al. 
(2004) if the pieces of supporting evidence are less typical, such as detailed factors that led to the 
determination that the account is indeed a CAM, individuals will view the detailed evidence as 
support for a rare event and therefore judge the probability of the event (unreliable/inaccurate 
account) to be lower, a phenomenon referred to as superadditivity7. 
Based on the boundary condition of Support Theory, I predict that more detailed 
descriptions of the CAM account will result in higher assessments in the reliability and accuracy 
of the CAM account.  Similarly, I expect that detailed descriptions of the audit procedures will 
increase nonprofessional investor’s confidence in the audit report and perceptions of audit 
quality.  Finally I predict, based on Support Theory (Tversky and Koehler 1994, Sloman et al. 
2004) that additional detail in a CAM disclosure will increase nonprofessional investors’ 
perceptions of financial reporting quality by providing additional, atypical evidence of why the 
underlying account is uncertain and subjective. 
The results of the study provide support for my hypotheses.  Consistent with the 
boundary condition of Support Theory, when a CAM is disclosed in greater detail, 
nonprofessional investors’ confidence in the accuracy and reliability of the disclosed account 
                                                          
 
7 In the context of Support Theory (Tversky and Koehler 1994, Sloman et al. 2004) subaddivity refers to the 
phenomena where an unpacked description of an event/item (e.g. value of an insurance policy covering heart 
attacks, cancer, or any other disease) is judged to be greater than a packed description of the same event/item (e.g. 
value of an insurance policy covering any disease).  In contrast, supperadditivity refers to the phenomena where an 
unpacked description of an event/item (e.g. value of an insurance policy covering cirrhosis, pneumonia, diabetes, or 
any other disease) that contains very specific or atypical evidence support the event is judged to be lower than a 
pack description of the same event/item (e.g. value of an insurance policy covering any disease) (Sloman et al. 
2004). 
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increases.  Further, assessments of audit quality and auditor competence increase when the audit 
procedures disclosed in the audit report are disclosed in greater detail than when they are 
disclosed in generic detail.  Finally, I find that the levels of CAM disclosure detail and audit 
procedure detail interact to significantly increase investment in the disclosing client firm, 
suggesting that the changes to the audit report are perceived as useful and informative by 
nonprofessional investors. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, this study is one of the first 
experiments to document nonprofessional investors’ perception of CAM disclosure and the 
related audit procedures and how these disclosures influence confidence in the financial 
statements and the audit report.  Without implementation of the recent PCAOB re-proposal it 
will be difficult if not impossible for nonprofessional investors to acquire any meaningful data 
concerning the details of the audit and audit procedures.  As noted by Coram (2010) it is 
challenging to examine how a particular group of investors will behave through market-based, 
archival studies; an experiment has the benefit of examining the behavior of this specific 
population (Clor-Proell et al. 2014, Libby et al. 2015) and teasing out the parts of a regulatory 
environment that does not yet exist in practice to observe which parts of the proposal will have 
the most significant impact on nonprofessional investors’ judgment.  This research documents 
that the PCAOB’s proposed standard does have a significant, differential impact on 
nonprofessional investors’ judgments. 
Second, this study contributes to the literature by analyzing how nonprofessional 
investors’ confidence in the financial statements is impacted by the language of the CAM 
disclosure and the disclosure of related audit procedures where more/less details in the disclosure 
will lead to differential perceptions of financial reporting quality and audit quality.  Third, this 
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study suggests that nonprofessional investors’ perception of audit quality is impacted by the 
disclosure of audit procedures in the audit report despite actual levels of assurance quality 
remaining unchanged.  Finally, supplemental analysis shows that the disclosure of the CAM and 
related audit procedures significantly impacts investment in the client firm, suggesting that the 
information contained within the disclosure is perceived as valuable by nonprofessional investors 
making investment decisions. 
This paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 provides a review of the relevant literature 
and theory, Section 3 discusses the hypotheses development, Section 4 describes the 
experimental methodology, Section 5 provides tests of hypotheses and explain the results, 
Section 6 provides a discussion of the supplemental analyses, Section 7 provides a discussion of 
my experimental findings, and Section 8 presents conclusions, implications, limitations, and 
opportunities for future research.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW & THEORY 
This section provides a review of relevant accounting literature and theory. In order to 
answer my research questions, this study employs the Support Theory (Tverskey and Kohler 
1994) and the boundary condition of Support Theory (Sloman et al. 2004) to motivate testable 
hypotheses. 
2.1 Auditing Standards 
 Under current SEC reporting rules, an external financial statement audit performed by an 
independent auditor is required for all issuers who are listed on U.S. exchanges.  The SEC 
specifically requires that all firms listed on exchanges in the U.S. are issued an unqualified 
opinion to remain listed on the exchange.  These regulatory restrictions have resulted in an 
environment where the standard auditor’s report is boilerplate in nature and symbolic in its value 
to nonprofessional investors (Cohen Commission 1978, Church et al. 2008, Carcello 2012, Mock 
et al. 2013, Carver and Trinkle 2016).  Qualitative investigations have shown that the majority of 
nonprofessional investors only briefly review the auditor’s report to verify that the opinion is 
unqualified and to look for any language that would be a departure from a boilerplate disclosure 
(Gray et al. 2011, Mock et al. 2013).   
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The uninformative and boilerplate nature of the standard auditor’s report have led 
investors and other users to demand significant changes to enhance the information content and 
the value of the message communicated through the auditor’s report (e.g. CFA Institute 2011).  
The most recent proposals to overhaul the standard audit report began in 2003, when the 103rd 
American Assembly proposed variable levels of assurance on different accounts within the 
financial statements based on the level of subjectivity in those accounts (The American 
Assembly 2003).  The U.S. Department of Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing 
Profession recommend that the SEC and PCAOB adopt a standard setting agenda to reform the 
standard audit report and include additional information to the user of the audit report (ACAP 
2008).  The Certified Financial Analysts (CFA) Institute, in its annual survey of members, has 
frequently and repeatedly lobbied for an expanded audit report that includes specific information 
about the auditor, information concerning how the auditor came to their opinion, information on 
materiality level for the audit engagement, and information on areas that are subject to higher 
risk (CFA 2008, 2010, 2011).  Carver and Trinkle (2016) note that despite these outcries for 
significant revision to the auditor’s report, the report has effectively remained unchanged in its 
content and presentation since 1948 (Mock et al 2013), with the most recent change to the audit 
report coming in the form of SAS No. 58, Reports on Audited Financial Statements, in April 
1988 (AICPA 1988a) which eliminated the “subject to” qualification of opinions.   
To respond to continued investor dissatisfaction with the contents of the standard audit 
report, the PCAOB adopted several regulatory initiatives (e.g. Reid et al. 2015, Turner et al. 
2010, Blake et al. 2011).   To inform their standard setting process the PCAOB surveyed 
members of its Investor Advisory Group.  The majority of respondents to a PCAOB Investor 
Advisory Group survey stated their belief that the audit report should contain information about 
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the areas of the audit that pose the greatest financial statement and audit risk and the procedures 
completed to reduce these risks (Reid et al. 2015), prompting the PCAOB to produce a rule that 
would address these concerns. 
2.2 Proposed PCAOB Changes to the Audit Report 
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has been engaged in 
revising the content and form of the standard audit report to address investor concerns about the 
transparency of the audit engagement and the informativeness of the audit report (PCAOB 2013) 
and has released several concept releases and proposed rules to address the issue (PCAOB 2011, 
PCAOB 2013, PCAOB 2016).  In response to the report issued by the US Department of 
Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP 2008) the PCAOB adopted a 
standard setting initiative to increase the informativeness of the standard audit report for 
investors and other users. 
The PCAOB began its standard setting initiative by promulgating a concept release in 
June 2011 titled Concept Release on Possible Revisions to PCAOB Standards Related to Reports 
on Audited Financial Statements (PCOAB 2011).  The concept release included a proposal for an 
addendum to the auditor’s report framed as an auditor’s discussion and analysis (AD&A).  The 
proposal was applauded by investors and investor advocacy groups, but was met with significant 
resistance by preparers and practitioners.  The major concern of preparers and practitioners was 
that the AD&A would result in the auditor encroaching on management’s responsibility as the 
source of new information, would promote decreased communication between the auditor and 
the audit committee, and have the unintended consequences of reducing overall audit quality 
(PCAOB 2010a, PCAOB 2010b, PCAOB 2011b) 
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Cognizant of the criticism of the 2011 concept release, the PCAOB proposed a new 
auditing rule in August 2013 titled Proposed Auditing Standards – The Auditor’s Report on an 
Audit of Financial Statements when the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion (PCAOB 
2013).  At the core of the 2013 proposed rule were critical audit matters that would be 
communicated within the auditor’s report rather than a separate commentary by the auditor.  As 
PCAOB Chairman James R. Doty stated, the changes were motivated to “make the auditor’s 
report more relevant to investors” (PCAOB 2013b, paragraph 3).   
The 2013 proposed rule was, again, met with stiff resistance from preparers who argued 
that the disclosures of CAMs in the audit report would not achieve the objective of making the 
auditor’s report more informative for investors.  The argument that CAM disclosure would 
confuse users of who was the responsible party for disclosing novel information (management or 
the auditor) resurfaced and concerns of a chilling effect between the auditor and the audit 
committee were resurrected (PCAOB 2014a, PCAOB 2014b).  Further, the language within the 
proposed rule left a significant amount of room for auditor judgment on what accounts were and 
were not to be disclosed as critical audit matters, leading prepares to argue that the number of 
accounts that would need to be disclosed as CAMs would again render the audit report 
meaningless through the sheer volume of information (PCAOB 2014a, PCAOB 2014b). 
Most recently, the PCAOB re-proposed a rule mandating critical audit matter (CAM) and 
audit procedure disclosures in the auditor’s report in a May 2016 release (PCAOB 2016).  The 
re-proposed rule retained the requirement for disclosure of CAMs in the audit report, but limited 
the definition of CAMs as “any matter that was communicated or required to be communicated 
to the audit committee and that: relates to accounts or disclosures that are material to the 
financial statements, and involved especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor 
14 
 
judgment” (PCAOB 2016, Page 3).  The clarification of the definition of a CAM is in response 
to concerns of a chilling effect of communication between the audit committee and the auditor 
by limiting the accounts that can be disclosed as a CAM as those that are already required to be 
communicated to the audit committee.  The audit committee8, acting as an oversight of the audit 
and representing the best interests of stakeholders, was reasoned to be an appropriate starting 
point for the determination of a CAM (PCAOB 2016).  The requirement that the matter be 
material makes it more objective for the auditor to determine what accounts would constitute a 
critical audit matter and would eliminate the possibility that too many CAMs are considered by 
the auditor and communicated in the auditor’s report (PCAOB 2016).  
Specifically included in the PCAOB’s May 11, 2016 proposed rule is the mandatory 
disclosure of a critical audit matters (CAMs) paragraph9 to detail those matters encountered 
during the audit that were especially challenging, subjective, or complex10 and how the auditor 
responded to these matters (PCAOB 2016).  The PCAOB expects that typical CAM areas will 
                                                          
 
8 Under current PCAOB standards, the auditor is required to communicate the following items to the audit 
committee: 1) significant risks identified by the auditor, 2)certain matters regarding the company’s accounting 
policies, practices, and estimates, 3) significant unusual transactions, 4) certain matters regarding the auditor’s 
evaluation of the company’s relationships and transactions with related parties, and 5) other matters arising from the 
audit that are significant to the oversight of the company’s financial reporting process (PCAOB 2016, Page 18-19). 
9 In the PCAOB’s proposal, critical audit matters (CAMs) would be disclosed following the opinion paragraph in the 
audit report but before the auditor’s signature (PCAOB 2016).  The first paragraph of the CAM disclosure would 
explain the nature of CAMs in general and explicitly state that the CAMs identified do not alter the opinion provided 
by the auditor on the financial statements.  The paragraphs following this introductory paragraph would then list the 
CAMs identified, how the auditor determined the item was a CAM, and any relevant procedures and audit testing 
used to increase the auditor’s confidence in the subject matter affected by the CAM. 
10 The PCAOB re-proposed rule lists several factors for the auditor to consider before disclosing an account as a 
CAM in the auditor’s report (PCAOB 2016).  These factors include: 1) the auditor’s assessment of the risks of 
material misstatement, 2) the degree of auditor subjectivity in determining or applying audit procedures to address 
the matter o in evaluating the results of those procedures, 3) the nature and extent of audit effort required to address 
the matter, 4) the degree of auditor judgments related to areas in the financial statements that involved the 
application of significant judgment or estimation by management, including estimates with significant measurement 
uncertainty, 5) the nature and timing of significant unusual transactions and the extent of audit effort and judgment 
related to these transactions, 6) and the nature of audit evidence obtained regarding the CAM (PCAOB 2016, Page 
12-13). 
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include “significant management estimates and judgments made in preparing the financial 
statements; areas of high financial statement and audit risk; unusual transactions; and other 
significant changes in the financial statements” (PCAOB 2016, 2).  Comment letters originating 
from investors claim that the inclusion of CAMs in the audit report would help increase the 
credibility of the audit (e.g. CFA 2011) and could serve as an attention director when evaluating 
the reliability of the financial statements. 
Of particular note in the PCAOB’s 2016 re-release is the principles-based framework that 
would be used to determine CAMs by leveraging work already performed by the auditor under 
the existing PCAOB rules and standards (PCAOB 2016).  The PCAOB states that “[d]epending 
on the matter, the auditor’s determination that a matter is a critical audit matter might be based 
on only one factor, a combination of the factors, or other factors specific to the audit” (PCAOB 
2016, Page 25).  The principles-based framework does not allow for a matter that, if present, 
would always constitute a critical audit matter.  The PCAOB has effectively left it to the 
auditor’s judgment to determine what a critical audit matter is, how to disclose the critical audit 
matter, and how the disclosed critical audit matter was addressed in the audit engagement with 
related audit procedures.  These significant regulatory changes have spurred academic interest in 
how the revisions to the standard audit report are received by varying classes of stakeholders. 
2.3 Accounting Literature 
 Academics have investigated the effect of changes to the auditor’s report in international 
jurisdictions where critical or key audit matter (KAM) disclosures have been mandated by statute 
or regulation.  In 2013, standards became effective in the U.K. that required the audit committee 
report to identify significant financial statement issues and the discussion surrounding these 
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issues11 (Reid et al. 2015).  The regulation’s revisions go on, requiring the auditor to discuss in 
the auditor’s report their assessed risk of material misstatement and the materiality threshold that 
was used by the auditor in the current engagement (Reid et al. 2015).  Specifically, the auditor is 
required to disclose the risks that “had the greatest effect on the overall audit strategy, the 
allocation of resources in the audit and directing the efforts of the engagement team” (FRC 2013, 
6).   
2.3.1 International Archival Evidence 
The standards promulgated by the FRC and IAASB share some similarities with the 
PCAOB’s re-proposed rule.  Key Audit Matters (KAMs) are similar to the PCAOB’s CAMS in 
that they are described as areas that are highly subjective and involve significant accounting 
estimates.  Both sets of standards require the auditor to disclosure the area or account and how 
the matter was addressed in the audit using a principles-based framework.  The FRC and IAASB 
standards diverge from the PCAOB in stating the level of materiality for the engagement and 
how the auditor arrived at their stated level of materiality for the client firm.  Further, the areas 
disclosed as KAMs are identified as those with the highest risk of material misstatement, 
language not mandated by the PCAOB.  Finally, the FRC requires that the auditor disclose their 
conclusion on the KAM account to the audit committee based on the results of their procedures.  
While both standards involve a principles-based framework in meeting the regulatory 
                                                          
 
11 A brief review of the Independent Auditor’s Report for U.K. Fortune 40 firms revealed the following issues listed 
as key audit matters: rebates, chargebacks, and returns (AstraZeneca 2016), valuation of intangible assets 
(AstraZeneca 2016), litigation and contingent liabilities (AstraZeneca 2016, BP 2016, RBS 2016), carrying value of 
assets (BP 2016), revenue recognition (Vodafone 2015, Carnival 2016, Glencore 2016), management override and 
earnings management (Glencore 2016), recoverability of aged and overdue receivables, loans, and advance 
payments (Glencore 2016), impairment of loans and advances (HSBC 2015, RBS 2016), and estimates of future 
profitability (RBS 2016). 
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requirements, the language and disclosures required by U.K. auditors are more focused on the 
risk of material misstatement, potentially due to differences in the legal environment between the 
U.S. and U.K. 
Researchers were quick to investigate what effect, if any, the expanded audit report 
would have on levels of audit quality, financial reporting quality, and audit fees.  The revised 
regulatory environment created by the FRC rule resulted in a significant decrease in abnormal 
accruals and the propensity to meet or beat analyst forecasts (Reid et al. 2015) in the year 
following adoption in the U.K.  In a separate study, Lennox et al. (2015) find that the valuation 
coefficients following the year of adoption in the U.K. were not significantly different from those 
for the year prior to adoption, suggesting that the enhanced disclosures are not informative to 
investors.  Lennox et al. (2015) conclude that disclosing critical audit matters may not aid 
investors in distinguishing between more and less risky companies because investors are already 
equipped to identify those firms that were more risky and those firm that were less risky.  
Gutierrez et al. (2016) investigate the impact of changes to the audit report in the United 
Kingdom and report conflicting evidence in their results.  They find that audit fees change 
variably (increase of 4% to no change depending on the model used) but do not find any 
evidence of change to audit quality nor any public reaction to the new auditor’s report.  The 
conflicting results from an archival perspective provide motivation to determine what effect, if 
any, CAM disclosures and the audit procedures engaged to address them in the audit report have 
on nonprofessional investors’ confidence in the audit report and financial statements in a 
controlled experimental setting. 
18 
 
2.3.2 Experimental Evidence 
The majority of experimental research conducted with respect to CAMs has been done in 
a litigation setting to determine the incremental effect of CAM disclosure on jurors’ perception 
of auditor liability12.  Backof et al. (2015) find that an inclusion of the specific audit procedures 
conducted to address the CAM in the audit report results in a higher likelihood that the auditor is 
found negligent by a jury, but that this effect is mitigated when the term “reasonable assurance” 
is defined within the audit report.  In contrast, a working paper by Brown et al. (2014) provides 
evidence consistent with the story model13 that suggests the inclusion of CAMs in the auditor’s 
report will decrease the evaluation of negligence on the part of the auditor; however, in the 
presence of CAMs, when the auditor is determined to have acted negligently, proposed damages 
are more severe.  This result suggests that audit quality is perceived to be higher in the presence 
of a CAM disclosure than in the absence of a CAM disclosure.   
A different stream of research has investigated how users of financial statements and the 
auditor’s report will receive the revisions to the standard auditor’s report.  A working paper by 
Sirois et al. (2014) shows that the inclusion of a CAM in the audit report is successful in 
motivating users to allocate additional cognitive resources to the issues mentioned in the report; 
however, the inclusion of a CAM has the drawback of reducing perceived audit quality, 
inconsistent with the intentions of regulators.  A second working paper by Carver and Trinkle 
                                                          
 
12 As noted in a working paper by Kachelmeier et al. (2016) a large volume of comment letters to the PCAOB’s 
2011 concept release and the PCAOB’s 2013 proposed rule were concerned with changes to the standard audit 
report would impact auditor’s legal exposure and legal liability (Ernst & Young 2013, KPMG 2013, Tysiac 2013, 
Zietsman, Burns, Pruitt, and Simer 2013). 
13 The story model (Pennington and Hastie 1992) suggests that jurors construct narratives in their mind to make 
sense of the information presented during a trial while reaching their verdicts.  In their manuscript, Brown et al. 
(2014) argue that the inclusion of a CAM disclosure will decrease jurors’ assessments of auditor negligence as the 
judges interpret the information as a story of the auditor’s competence by warning the investors that the area 
disclosed is very complex and subject to error. 
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(2016) examine how investors perceive the revision to the standard auditor’s report and how the 
changes impact perceptions of auditor credibility and management credibility.  The results show 
that the inclusion of a CAM in the auditor’s report does not impact investors’ perceptions of 
auditor credibility, reliability, but can impact management credibility under certain 
circumstances.  Further, the inclusion of a CAM in the auditor’s report does not impact valuation 
assessments, leading Carver and Trinkle (2016) to conclude that the revisions to the report will 
have little to no impact on investors’ judgments.  
Other researchers suspect that the format of CAM disclosures could differentially impact 
investors’ judgments.  A working paper by Dennis et al. (2016) examines the impact of visual 
cues in auditor disclosures and how the cues impact nonprofessional investors’ interpretation of 
the information.  The authors find that a narrative description of the audit disclosure is not 
weighted by nonprofessional investors and is used as a substitute for management disclosures in 
valuation judgments.  The authors further find that visual cues in the audit disclosure change how 
nonprofessional investors weight the audit disclosure and the management disclosure where 
nonprofessional investors discount P/E multiples to a greater extent in the presence of an auditor 
visual disclosure relative to an auditor narrative disclosure (Dennis et al. 2016).   
 Kachelmeier et al. (2016) provide a different perspective on financial statement reliability 
in the presence of a CAM disclosure.  In their experiment, Kachelmeier et al. (2016) find that 
user confidence in financial statements containing a CAM is lower relative to user confidence 
after viewing financial statements containing no CAM.  Kachelmeier et al. (2016) cite Heymann 
(2010) and Literary Theory to explain that the disclosure of a CAM may act as a warning that the 
financial statements need to be interpreted with caution.  Literary Theory explains how readers 
of a message interpret the contents of that message.  When a message contains contravening or 
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unexpected language, the reader of that message adopts a cautionary perspective when reading 
the remainder of the message and interpreting the information that the message relates to.  In the 
case of CAMs, the contravening language contained within the CAM (e.g. involved especially 
challenging, subjective, or complex audit judgment) after reading the unqualified opinion offered 
on the financial statements will motivate users to me more skeptical of the information that the 
contravening language (CAM) referred to, in this case the financial statements and the CAM 
account specifically. 
The existing literature on critical audit matter disclosures is subject to several limitations.  
For example, Kachelmeier et al. (2016) does not consider how the freedom given to the auditor 
by the PCAOB in fulfilling their regulatory obligation will impact nonprofessional investors’ 
confidence in the reliability and accuracy of the reported figures.  I differentiate my study by 
examining how detailed  language included in a CAM disclosure may be interpreted differently 
from generic language in a CAM disclosure by nonprofessional investors.  Further, I help to 
inform policy by following the guidance set out in the PCAOB’s May 11, 2016 re-proposed 
standard that includes mandatory disclosure of how the auditor addressed the CAM in the 
auditor’s report (i.e. audit procedures).  Finally, my dependent measures capture both perceptions 
of financial reporting quality and perceptions of audit quality to determine if the language 
contained with the CAM disclosure along with the language of the engaged auditing procedures 
results in a differential effect for perceived financial reporting quality and perceived audit quality 
(Gaynor et al. 2016). 
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2.4 Literary Theory and the Disclaimer Effect 
The “disclaimer effect”14 from Literary Theory states that the presence of contravening 
language in a narrative will serve as an attention director to readers of the narrative that the 
information they are about to be exposed to should be attended to very carefully.  In the present 
context15, the disclaimer effect should not be interpreted to suggest that the auditor is offering a 
disclaimer of opinion on the financial statements, nor or they disclaiming responsibility for the 
audit.  A disclaimer effect simply suggests that the presence of contravening language will 
capture the reader’s attention so they will fully attend to the disclosed items.  However, if the 
user of the audit report views the CAM as providing additional assurance on the disclosed 
account and the financial statements, it could reinforce the presence of an unqualified opinion, 
resulting in higher perceptions of audit quality. 
Disclaimers within a narrative or message exist to encourage users of the product or 
document to which the narrative refers to exercise appropriate care and precaution (Heymann 
2010).  Further, effective disclaimers are those consisting of language that is unexpected by the 
reader (Heymann 2010).  This statement suggests that the unique presentation of CAMs as 
                                                          
 
14 Please note that the “disclaimer effect” as stated in this paper is not synonymous or related to a disclaimer of 
opinion by the auditor.  The auditor is supplying a level of reasonable assurance on the financial statements as a 
whole.  The “disclaimer effect” simply refers to the auditor brining a specific account to the attention of the reader 
and explaining why is was a subjective and difficult account to audit.  However, despite these difficulties, the 
auditor is satisfied with the representation of the account in the financial statements.  The “disclaimer effect” 
suggests that, when a good or service is highlighted with contravening language (e.g. account characterized by 
difficult and subjective estimates) the reader will be more skeptical of the good or service and have their underlying 
confidence in the quality of the good or service adversely impacted.  As pointed out by Kachelmeier et al. (2016) the 
audit report is not a good or service but is the product of the auditor’s efforts and the disclosure of a CAM could 
amount to a “disclaimer effect”. 
15  A per Literary Theory (Heymann 2010) a disclaimer is defined as any language that suggests a contravening 
message to the primary message.  In the context of the audit report, a “disclaimer effect” would occur when 
language contained within the audit report is incongruent with the primary message, or opinion, of the audit report.  
If a CAM disclosure functions as a disclaimer, it will be interpreted as cautioning users in their interpretation of the 
financial statements, thus negatively impacting the perception of financial reporting quality. 
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proposed by the PCAOB will promote effortful reading and interpretation by the user of the audit 
report; whereas the audit report contains standardized language for each engagement, the CAM 
disclosure will be somewhat unique to each engagement by highlighting the accounting issues 
identified by the auditor and the tests conducted to address these issues leading to the “disclaimer 
effect”.  Additional results that support the “disclaimer effect” from Literary Theory are found in 
Christensen et al. (2014) where users’ confidence in the financial statements is negatively 
impacted by the disclosure of a CAM. 
2.5 Support Theory 
Support theory (Tversky and Koehler 1994) suggests that a judge will assess the 
likelihood of an event by evaluating the support for the underlying component hypotheses, 
defined as the descriptions of the event or the pieces of supporting evidence for the event, rather 
than by assessing the probability of the event itself.  The theory associates a description of the 
event with a support value that directly corresponds to the perceived strength of the description.  
By explicitly listing the justification for an event or hypothesis, a judge is able to “unpack” the 
event into supporting components, making them more confident in the probability of the 
underlying event. 
 An easily accessible example of support theory may be found in one of the experiments 
from Tversky and Koehler (1994).  In their experiment, Tversky and Koehler (1994) asked 
participants to judge the probability of two complementary hypotheses16: death by natural causes 
                                                          
 
16 As described by Doxey (2015), complementary hypotheses are defined as events that are mutually exclusive but 
together are exhaustive.  For example, the probabilities that it does rain or that it does not rain are mutually 
exclusive and cover all potential outcomes.  However, the event “does not rain” may be further unpacked into 
several component events (e.g. it is overcast, it is sunny, it snows). 
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or death by unnatural causes.  When participants were asked for their probability assessments of 
the packed hypotheses or events they estimated the probability assessments to be 58 percent and 
32 percent respectively (sum of 90 percent) (Tversky and Koehler 1994).  However, when the 
researchers asked participants to unpack death by natural causes into separate supporting 
hypotheses, such as death due to heart disease, cancer, or any other natural causes their 
probability assessments significantly increased to 73 percent (22 percent, 18 percent, and 33 
percent respectively).  The implication that was drawn by Tversky and Koehler (1994) was that 
for the probability assessment for death by natural causes to hold, the probability assessment for 
death by unnatural causes would have to be reduced so as not to exceed 100 percent, a 
phenomena that Tversky and Koehler (1994) termed “subadditivity”. 
 Support Theory has been shown to be robust in a number of settings with professionals.  
Brody et al. (2003) demonstrates that experienced decision makers from large international 
accounting firms more than double their probability assessments of material misstatement when 
given four pieces of supporting evidence about an audit client versus those who are given one, 
overarching piece of evidence17.  Auditors who assess fraud risk sequentially by area (e.g. 
revenue recognition/receivables, inventory, noncurrent assets, and management estimates) rather 
than simultaneously identify a greater quantity and quality of fraud risk assessments that are 
more evenly distributed over the areas assessed consistent with the unpacking feature of support 
theory (Chen et al. 2014); this is due to the increased salience of each category when it is 
                                                          
 
17 Brody et al. (2003) ask auditor participants for the probability of misstatement involving the valuation objective.  
In the packed condition, participants were asked to assign probabilities to the Inventory/Purchases Transaction 
Cycle, the Sales and Collection Transaction Cycle, and Some Other Transaction Cycle.  In the unpacked condition, 
Some Other Transaction Cycle was presented as four subsets: Investing Cycle, Financing Cycle, Payroll Cycle, or 
Some Other Transaction Cycle.  The results were consistent with the predictions of Support Theory (Tversky and 
Koehler 1994). 
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presented separately rather than contemporaneously (Van Boven and Epley 2003).  Hammersley 
et al. (2010) find that auditors who are reminded of eight areas of fraud risk within an 
organization make higher fraud risk assessments than auditors who are only presented with a 
summary memo of a fraud risk brainstorming session. 
 The predictive power of Support Theory has been demonstrated in a managerial realm as 
well.  When forecasts are disaggregated as opposed to aggregated, the forecasts result in greater 
forecast accuracy (compared to preparing aggregated forecasts) and disaggregated forecasts 
result in greater forecast optimism or the tendency to overestimate future performance (compared 
to preparing aggregated forecasts) consistent with the implications of Support Theory (Chen et 
al. 2015). 
Therefore, by detailing the considerations that led the auditor to determine the account 
was a CAM within the audit report, such as the considerations that are unique and specific to the 
firm in question, nonprofessional investors will be able to “unpack” the different dimensions of 
the CAM, such as the uncertainty surrounding estimates, the presence of significant management 
judgment, and the lack of historical information, leading them to increase their judgments of the 
uncertainty in the accuracy and reliability of the underlying account.  Nonprofessional investors 
will similarly unpack the separate audit procedures engaged to address the CAM, resulting in 
lower levels of confidence in the accuracy and reliability of the disclosed account and the quality 
of the audit. 
2.6 Boundary Condition of Support Theory 
Support Theory is subject to a boundary condition (Sloman et al. 2004).  When the 
supporting descriptions are more specific to a particular setting or atypical of the event they are 
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proposed to represent, unpacking results in judgments that the underlying event is less probable; 
Sloman et al. (2004) attribute this result to individuals unable to generalize the supporting 
descriptions to other examples of the parent hypothesis in their working memory.  Hammersley 
et al. (2010) demonstrate this phenomenon where auditors that unpack fraud risks assess a lower 
level of fraud risk when the fraud risks unpacked are unique and specific to the client firm.  
These unique fraud risks, which are less representative of fraud in general, occupy resources 
from working memory that could otherwise be used to attend to more likely fraud risks.  
Therefore, when the pieces of supporting evidence are viewed as atypical or ungeneralizable, 
unpacking would result in lower assessments in the target event.  As nonprofessional investors 
are unfamiliar with specific financial statement accounts and the risks that give rise to the CAM, 
any substantial detail in describing the CAM could be seen as atypical, especially if these details 
are firm specific.  Based on the previous discussion and expanding on the findings of 
Kachelmeier et al. (2016), it would be expected that a detailed disclosure of the factors that led 
the auditor to disclose the account as a critical audit matter would result in greater confidence in 
the CAM account than if the auditor gave a generic description of the CAM account if 
nonprofessional investors’ perceive the pieces of supporting evidence to be less generalizable to 
other firm.  If this is not the case, then unpacking will result in lower confidence in a CAM 
account when the account is disclosed in greater detail relative to generic detail.  For my 
hypotheses, I will utilize the boundary condition prediction from Support Theory as formulated 
by Sloman et al. (2004) which states that greater supporting evidence will result in higher 
confidence assessments in the accuracy and reliability of the disclosed account and higher 
perceptions of audit quality. 
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3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Support Theory suggests that individuals will assess the probability of an event 
subjectively depending on the amount of supporting evidence provided to them to evaluate the 
likelihood of the event (Tversky and Koehler 1994).  The PCAOB’s re-proposed rule to expand 
the standard audit report with a principles-based framework for the allows for significant 
judgment in how the auditor decides to meet their mandate.  Specifically, it is left to the audit 
firm and audit partner’s judgment to determine what level of detail or granularity they will 
disclose the CAMs identified during the financial statement audit and the audit procedures that 
were engaged to address the CAMs.  As seen from KAM disclosures in the U.K., this level of 
detail can vary significantly. 
Based on prior research in psychology and accounting (Tversky and Koehler 1994, 
Sloman et al. 2004, Kachelmeier et al. 2016) I predict that, and consistent with the boundary 
condition of Support Theory, nonprofessional investors will have greater confidence in the 
accuracy and reliability of the CAM account when the CAM is disclosed in greater detail relative 
to generic detail.   
H1:  Nonprofessional investors will be more confident in the accuracy and reliability of 
the CAM account when the CAM account is identified with a detailed disclosure in the 
auditor’s report relative to when a CAM account is identified with a generic disclosure. 
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The PCAOB’s re-proposed standard also calls for the auditor to disclose the audit 
procedures utilized to address the CAM and provide audit evidence supporting the assertions of 
management in the audit report.  The disclosures of audit procedures in other jurisdictions, 
particularly the Key Audit Matters required by the Financial Reporting Council in the U.K. and 
Ireland (FRC 2013), give the auditor great latitude with how and in what detail these procedures 
are disclosed.  Indeed, the PCAOB re-proposed standard encourages language that is specific and 
unique to each engagement but stops short of requiring detailed, specific language (PCAOB 
2016).  Therefore, it is pertinent to study the effect of audit procedure disclosure on 
nonprofessional investors’ confidence in the audit report and financial statements.  Following the 
unintuitive predictions from Support Theory’s boundary condition (Sloman et al. 2004), I posit 
that nonprofessional investors will be more confident in the accuracy and the reliability of a 
disclosed CAM account when the audit procedures engaged to address the CAM account are 
disclosed in greater detail. 
H2:  Nonprofessional investors will be more confident in the accuracy and reliability of 
the CAM account when the audit procedures engaged to address the CAM are disclosed 
in greater detail relative to generic detail. 
 
The intuitive predictions from Support Theory (Tversky and Koehler 1994) suggest that 
increased detail and specificity in the description of the audit procedures will lead to a greater 
unpacking effect and differentially impact perceptions of audit quality.  However, it should be 
noted that, objectively, assessments of audit quality should remain constant regardless of the 
description of the audit procedures performed as the PCAOB explicitly prohibits piecemeal 
assurance.  Any audit procedures performed would be to gather sufficient audit evidence to 
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satisfy the auditor that the risk of an audit error is reduced to the appropriate level.  Following 
Support Theory, I predict that greater detail and specificity used in describing the audit 
procedures engaged to address the CAM account will influence nonprofessional investors’ 
perceptions of audit quality positively.   
H3:  Nonprofessional investors will assess audit quality higher when the related audit 
procedures are described with greater detail in the auditor’s report relative to when the 
related audit procedures are described with generic detail in the auditor’s report.   
 
As noted by Gaynor et al. (2016), there is no consistently accepted definition of financial 
reporting quality.  The Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (FASB 2010) states the 
purpose of financial reporting is to provide insight into the underlying economic position of the 
reporting firm.  Following the definition adopted by Gaynor et al. (2016), I define greater 
financial reporting quality as “more complete, neutral, and free from error and provide more 
useful predictive or confirmatory information about the company’s underlying economic position 
and performance” (Gaynor et al. 2016, 2). 
Prior literature in the experimental realm has operationalized financial reporting quality 
and as the usefulness of the information to the investing party (Clor-Proell et al. 2014, Müller et 
al. 2015) and directly asked participants to assess financial reporting quality (McDaniel et al. 
2002).  Further, Gaynor et al. (2016) provide a review of the vast literature which demonstrates 
how audit quality is a determinant of financial reporting quality.  Based on this literature, I 
propose that nonprofessional investors will assess financial reporting quality higher when the 
related audit procedures are disclosed in greater detail. 
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H4:  Nonprofessional investors will assess financial reporting quality as higher when the 
related audit procedures are described in greater detail within the auditor’s report relative 
to when the related audit procedures are described in generic detail within the auditor’s 
report. 
 
As noted above, financial reporting quality has been operationalized in prior literature as 
information that is free from error, complete, and neutral (Gaynor et al. 2016).  Based on the 
prior literature, I posit that as the relationship between CAM disclosure language and financial 
reporting quality is mediated by their confidence in the accuracy and reliability of the disclosed 
CAM account. 
H5a:  Nonprofessional investors’ confidence in the accuracy and reliability of a CAM 
account will positively mediate the relationship between CAM disclosure detail and 
assessments of financial reporting quality. 
 
Further, following the large literature on the relationship between audit quality and 
financial reporting quality, the detail and specificity of the audit procedures performed could 
influence confidence in the financial statements since increased perceptions of audit quality 
could increase confidence in the underlying accounts as discussed by DeFond and Zhang (2014).  
Therefore, I predict that assessments of audit quality will mediate the relationship between the 
detail with which audit procedures are disclosed and financial reporting quality. 
H5b:  Nonprofessional investors’ assessment of audit quality will positively mediate the 
relationship between audit procedure disclosure detail and assessed financial reporting 
quality. 
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I next propose two hypotheses to explain how my independent variables indirectly impact 
assessed misstatement probability.   As participants grow more confident in the accuracy and 
reliability of the CAM account, as would be the case when the CAM account is disclosed in 
greater detail, and that the disclosure is complete and free from error, their assessments of the 
probability of material misstatement will decrease. 
H6a:  Nonprofessional investors’ confidence in the accuracy and reliability of a CAM 
account will negatively mediate the relationship between CAM disclosure detail and 
assessed probability of material misstatement. 
 
Similarly, as participants grow more confident that the auditor provided the correct 
opinion on the financial statements and that the quality of the audit engagement was high, as 
would be the case when the auditor procedures are disaggregated and described in greater detail, 
their assessments of the probability of material misstatement will decrease. 
H6b:  Nonprofessional investors’ assessments of audit quality will negatively mediate 
the relationship between audit procedures disclosure detail and assessed probability of 
material misstatement. 
 
 As the quality of the information reported in the financial statements decreases, 
nonprofessional investors will perceive additional risk to using the financial statements, 
including the risk of material misstatement.  As financial reporting quality is assessed to be lower 
and the financial statements are not complete or otherwise free from error, nonprofessional 
investors will assess the probability of misstatement to be higher. 
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H7:  Nonprofessional investors’ assessments of financial reporting quality will negatively 
impact their assessed misstatement probability. 
 
 Finally, as the quality of the financial statements decreases and the probability of material 
misstatement is assessed to be higher the investment opportunity will be viewed less positively.  
For example, Barton and Mercer (2005) provide evidence that analysts reduce their stock 
valuation when financial reporting quality is perceived to be poor.  Therefore, I predict that as 
assessments of material misstatement probability increase that nonprofessional investors will 
invest less in the target firm. 
H8:  Nonprofessional investors’ assessment of misstatement probability will negatively 
impact their decision to invest in the target firm and the magnitude of their investment. 
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Figure 1:  Theoretical Model for Test of Hypotheses and Mediation Analysis 
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4. METHOD 
4.1 Participants 
 For this research, participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk.  Amazon 
Mechanical Turk is an online labor marketplace where a requester may post a Human 
Intelligence Task (HIT) to be viewed by workers.  The data collected from participants on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk are considered to be reliable (Paolacci et al. 2010, Horton et al. 2010, 
Buhrmester et al. 2011, Farrell et al. 2017, Brasel et al. 2016) and prior research in accounting 
has successfully recruited participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk to proxy for 
nonprofessional investors (Rennekamp 2012, Rennekamp et al. 2015, Brasel et al. 2016).   
Workers recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk review the HIT to determine if they 
are interested in the study, attain any necessary qualifications, and then participate in the 
experimental case.  Upon completion of the study workers are directed back to Amazon 
Mechanical Turk where they enter a code acquired at the conclusion of the study to receive their 
compensation18. Amazon Mechanical Turk has been successfully used in the past to recruit 
participants as a proxy for nonprofessional investors (Rennekamp 2012, Cade 2016) and 
participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk have been shown to exert similar levels of 
effort and honesty as participants in prior research (Farrell et al. 2017). 
                                                          
 
18 Prior research indicates that the average hourly wage of Mechanical Turk participants is $1.38 (Horton and 
Chilton 2010).  The effective hourly wage of participants for my task was $5.37 far surpassing the average wage of 
other Amazon Mechanical Turk workers on the platform. 
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Participant demographics are reported in Table One.  They report a mean (median) of 
4.69 (2.00) accounting classes.  Participants also provide the approximate value of their equity 
holdings as of December 31, 2016, (two months prior to the experiment) by selecting zero or a 
range of values inclusive from $1 to over $100,000.  Ranges were provided for participants to 
ensure a degree of confidentiality if participants were anxious about disclosing the exact value of 
equity holdings.  Using the lower bound of each response range (Doxey 2015), participants have 
an average of $21,155.06 in equity holdings.  Using the midpoint of each response range, 
participants have an average of $37,020.03 in equity holdings.  These demographic results 
suggest that my sample consists of equity investors who manage their own small portfolios. 
I next test for mean differences between conditions with my demographic variables, 
equity holdings, number of accounting classes, number of financial statement reviewed each 
month, number of stock transactions engaged in a year, self-assessed familiar with financial 
statement audits, and full-time work experience.  Of these variables, only accounting courses is 
significant at the α=.05 level (p=.034).  This variable is not used as a covariate in ANCOVA 
analysis to capture variance that would otherwise be erroneously attributed to the independent 
variables since the CV does not have a significant effect on the dependent measure of interest 
when included in the ANCOVA. 
The populations described above were used as a proxy for nonprofessional investors in a 
2 x 2 + 1 (control) between-participants experimental design manipulating CAM disclosure 
detail and related audit procedure disclosure detail. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Sample (n=91) 
            Treatment conditions (CAM Disclosure Detail/Audit Procedures Detail) 
  DETAILED/ 
DETAILED 
  DETAILED / 
GENERIC 
  GENERIC / 
DETAILED 
  GENERIC/  
GENERIC 
  
CONTROL 
  
  n = 22 n = 18 n = 18 n = 18 n = 18 
Variables Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Equity Holdings 4.45 1.53 4.88 1.58 3.76 1.39 4.43 1.47 3.36 1.28 
F/S Month 1.95 2.26 2.06 3.67 3.06 6.58 1.52 2.16 4.86 8.08 
Accounting Classes 3.77 4.98 4.29 4.82 7.59 6.62 4.19 4.63 3.86 5.48 
Stocks 15.91 19.71 24.94 34.10 32.12 58.78 20.52 23.78 22.21 23.70 
Familiarity with Audits 5.14 1.32 4.24 1.86 5.29 1.10 4.76 1.26 4.07 1.44 
Work Experience 14.73 10.56 14.88 12.38 10.47 8.48 16.62 12.50 8.79 5.58 
                      
              
  Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Gender: 
 
       
 
 
 
 
Male 15 68% 11 65% 13 76% 12 57% 9 64% 
Female 7 32% 6 35% 4 24% 9 43% 5 36% 
                      
Definition of Variables 
 
  
   
Equity Holdings 
Approximate value of participants' equity holding as of December 31, 
2016 (1=$0, 2=$1-$10,000, 3=$10,001-$20,000, 4=$20,001-$50,000, 
5=$50,001-$100,000, 6=$100,001 or more. 
       F/S Month How many public company financial statements are read a month. 
     Accounting Classes How many accounting classes were taken at the college level. 
   Stocks Number of stock transaction engaged in annually.        
   Familiarity with Audits Familiarity with financial statement audits of publicly traded companies.        
   Work Experience Year of full-time professional work experience.        
   A two-way MANOVA revealed significant differences between conditions with Equity Holdings (p=.034).  All other variables were insignificant (p>.10).   
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4.2 Experimental Procedures 
 A 2 x 2 + 1 (control) between-participants experiment was conducted with CAM 
disclosure detail and audit procedure detail as the manipulated independent variables.  The 
experiment was administered online through Qualtrics, a web-based survey platform.  My first 
independent variable, CAM disclosure detail, was manipulated at two levels (Detailed / Generic).  
My second independent variable, audit procedure detail, was manipulated at two levels (Detailed 
/ Generic).  It is important to note that both levels of the manipulation contain all four of the 
mandatory disclosures detailed in the PCAOB’s 2016 re-proposed rule and no condition contains 
any information that would be explicitly prohibited by the release and indeed may be encouraged 
by the PCAOB (see PCAOB 2016 for a discussion).  It is important to point out that my 
experimental design is only manipulating one construct, specificity, in two different ways.  My 
two experimental manipulations affect specificity in two areas of the audit report: CAM 
disclosure and audit procedure disclosure. 
 To operationalize my independent variables, I reviewed the language and examples 
included in the PCAOB’s 2016 re-proposed rule19.  Further, I reviewed a selection of audit 
reports of several financial service firms filing in the U.K. who are required to comply with the 
FRC’s KAM disclosure.  I identified those KAMs that were most often disclosed by the auditor 
and reviewed the language included in the KAM disclosure.  Further, I reviewed how the auditor 
gained assurance on the KAM account (synonymous to the PCAOB’s related audit procedure 
requirement) to understand which audit procedures would most likely be disclosed for the CAM 
                                                          
 
19 Prior experimental research on CAMs (e.g. Kachelmeier et al. 2016, Carver and Trinkle 2016) use the PCAOB’s 
2013 guidance to develop their experimental manipulations.  I follow and expand on this methodology by following 
the PCAOB’s updated and revised 2016 guidance as well as reviewing actual KAM disclosures for financial service 
firms in the U.K. 
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I had chosen.  The language and detail of the disclosures in the U.K. regulatory environment 
were used as a model for my own experimental manipulations while retaining the requirements 
of the PCAOB’s 2016 release.   
 The first independent variable, CAM disclosure detail, was operationalized as the pieces 
of supporting evidence that led the auditor to identify the account in question as a CAM.  In the 
Generic Disclosure manipulation, the audit report disclosed that the account was a CAM due to 
the auditor’s complex and subjective judgment in evaluating management’s estimates.  The 
Detailed Disclosure manipulation expanded on this explanation by identifying specific areas 
where the auditor was required to use their complex and subjective judgment in evaluating 
management’s estimates: the historical loss data for the new loan program, the qualitative 
adjustments to the model for estimating the provision for credit losses (CAM account), and the 
sensitivity of the historical loss model to subjective estimates. 
 The second independent variable, audit procedure disclose detail, was operationalized as 
the number of specific tests identified by the auditor to achieve their audit objective.  Previous 
studies have failed to identify a significant effect of audit procedure disclosure in the audit report 
on users’ perceptions; however, these studies have focused on the mere presence of the audit 
procedures in the auditor’s report and have not examined the features of disclosing the 
procedures that may impact nonprofessional investors’ judgments.  Following the methodology 
above, I reviewed several audit reports and KAMs from the U.K. and listed those procedures that 
were observed multiple times in distinct reports.  I adopted the language contained within these 
audit procedure disclosures for use in my audit procedure disclosure manipulation following the 
examples from the PCAOB’s 2016 re-proposed rule.   
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In the Generic Audit Procedure Disclosure condition, the audit report disclosed that the 
auditor: tested the design and controls over the Company’s new models, compared 
management’s assumptions for impairment to externally available data, and performed detailed 
testing on a sample of the models for unidentified impairment.  The Detailed Audit Procedure 
Disclosure condition expanded on these disclosures by identifying three specific subsets of audit 
tests performed for each audit program.  The complete audit report with manipulated conditions 
may be found in Figure 2.  Full experimental materials are available in Appendix A. 
Participants were presented a case where they were asked to assume the role of a 
nonprofessional investor and evaluate a pair of fictitious firms operating in the financial services 
industry as an investment prospect utilizing the summary financial information, notes to the 
financial statements, and the auditor’s report presented in the case.  Both of the fictitious firms in 
the experimental instrument belonged to the financial services industry as a conscious design 
choice.  While participants are intimately familiar with everyday financial institutions and the 
service offerings that concern individual consumers, the population of interest is not suspected to 
be familiar with the large array of commercial services financial institutions provide.  Gaynor et 
al. (2016) state that complexity and subjectivity in the financial reporting function will create a 
more difficult auditing environment; therefore, if a CAM disclosure in conjunction with the 
disclosure of audit procedures has any effect on confidence judgments, this effect should be 
amplified in this industry and setting. 
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The critical audit matter communicated below is a matter arising from the current period audit that was 
communicated or required to be communicated to the audit committee and that: (1) relates to accounts or 
disclosures that are material to the financial  statements and (2) involved our especially challenging, 
subjective, or complex  judgments. Critical audit matters do not alter in any way our opinion on the financial 
statements, taken as a whole, and we do not provide separate opinions on the critical audit matters or on the accounts 
or disclosures to which they relate.      
 
Provision for Credit Losses - New Loan Product      
As more fully described in Notes 1 and 7 to the financial statements, during 2015, Aubrek Banking began actively 
marketing a nine-year collateralized loan obligation instrument in addition to the three- and five-year collateralized 
loan obligation instruments historically marketed.  At December 31, 2015, the nine-year loans represented 
approximately 25% of the collateralized loan obligation instrument portfolio.  The provision for credit losses is 
estimated by management through the application of judgment and the use of highly subjective assumptions.   
 
We determined that the provision for credit losses is a critical audit matter due, in part, to the involvement of our 
complex and subjective judgments in evaluating management's estimates and the significance of their judgments.   
 
[Specifically, these estimates and judgments included such items as the limited historical loss data for the new loan 
program, the qualitative adjustments to the model for estimating the provision for credit losses, and the sensitivity of 
the historical loss model to subjective estimates, among others.]   
 
Auditor's Response to the Critical Audit Matter      
We planned and performed several procedures related to the provision for credit losses for the nine-year loans in 
connection with forming our overall opinion on the financial statements.      
 
These procedures included, among other procedures, testing the design and operating effectiveness of key controls 
over the Company’s new model, [including the test of controls over the impairment calculation models including 
data inputs, controls over collateral valuation estimates, and governance controls including attending key meetings 
that form part of the approval process for loan impairment provisions].      
 
We compared management’s assumptions for both collective and individual impairment allowances to externally 
available data, [including a critical assessment of management’s revisions to estimates and assumptions, specifically 
in respect of the inputs to the impairment models in the commercial and global banking portfolios and the 
consistency of judgment applied in the use of the economic factors, loss emergence periods, and the observation 
period for historical default rates].      
 
Finally, we performed detailed testing on a sample of new and existing models used to calculate both unidentified 
and identified impairment, [including testing of the coding used in the impairment models, re-performance of the 
calculation, testing the extraction of data used in the models, and testing and applying sensitivities to the underlying 
critical assumptions]. 
Figure 2:  Audit Report with Experimental Treatments20 
                                                          
 
20 The italicized, underlined font is only seen when CAM disclosure detail is Detailed in the Provision for Credit 
Losses section and related audit procedure detail is Detailed in the Auditors Response to the CAM section. 
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Related Audit Procedures Disclosure Detail 
Detailed Generic 
CAM 
Disclosure 
Detail 
Detailed Detailed / Detailed Generic / Detailed 
Generic Detailed / Generic Generic / Generic 
         Figure 3:  Experimental Design21 
To exploit the financial services setting where both of the fictitious firms operate, a 
critical audit matter detailing the provision for credit losses was included across all conditions for 
both firms.  The CAM discussed that a new series of collateralized loan obligations had been 
developed by the fictitious company and that the company’s policy for recognizing credit 
losses22 had been extended, creating a large degree of uncertainty when estimating the provision 
for credit losses for the year under audit.  Further, a relatively small increase in the provision for 
credit losses year-over-year could be seen in the comparative financial statements.  This mild 
increase to the provision for credit losses account in conjunction with the large increase in 
                                                          
 
21 For the Control Condition, there was no CAM disclosure and therefore, no related audit procedures.  
22 A review of key audit matters currently issued in the U.K. reporting regime determined that loan impairment 
provisions and provision for credit losses were common accounts listed for financial institutions (e.g. Royal Bank of 
Scotland 2016, HSBC 2016, Standard Chartered Bank 2015).   
41 
 
noninterest income from selling these instruments was another conscious design choice intended 
to arouse skepticism in the financial statements.  The PCAOB explicitly mentions revenue 
recognition issues, such as allowance for doubtful accounts or a credit loss provision, as an area 
in which CAMs will likely be employed in future audit reports (PCAOB 2013, 2016); the 
wording for the CAM was likewise adopted from the PCAOB’s 2016 example concerning 
revenue recognition.  
Participants were informed that both of the firms they were reviewing operated in the 
financial services industry and were publicly traded on the NASDAQ exchange.  Participants 
were informed that management was compensated for meeting or beating analyst benchmarks 
and were given the benchmark set for the year for both firms ($1.42 for each).  Summary 
financial statements were then presented to participants indicating that both firms had reported 
earnings per share of $1.45 for the year under audit, beating analyst expectations.  Following the 
presentation of the summary financial statements, participants were asked to assess the 
likelihood that a material misstatement existed for each firm that they (the participant) would 
consider important and the likelihood that a material misstatement existed for each firm that 
others would consider important.  Finally, participants were asked to make an investment 
decision and allocate $100,000 among the two firms. 
After reviewing the summary financial information and making their initial investment 
decision, participants were made aware of the identity of the audit firm for both firms.  Both 
firms were audited by a separate “Big Four” auditor23.  Participants were also informed about the 
                                                          
 
23 The auditor for each firm was distinct to avoid any spillover effects that may have been present in an experimental 
setting where both firms have the same external auditor.  Further, each Big Four auditor was assigned a fictitious 
name to control for any prior reputation that participants may have assigned to a specific firm. 
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PCAOB’s critical audit matter standard and how CAMs and the audit procedures engaged to 
address the CAMs were now required to be disclosed in the audit report.  Included in the 
description of the new standard is a statement that the disclosure of a CAM did not in any way 
alter the auditor’s opinion on the financial statements as a whole nor provide separate levels of 
assurance for different accounts.  Participants then proceeded to the next page where they found 
the auditor’s report for both firms which contained my manipulations and the notes to the 
financial statements where the critical audit matter is disclosed.   
The audit reports indicated that each firm was given an unqualified opinion by their 
respective external auditor and that each firm had a single critical audit matter related to the 
provision for credit losses.  The CAM disclosure and the auditor’s response to the CAM for 
Aubrek Banking were randomly selected from one of my four experimental treatments.  The 
CAM disclosure and the auditor’s response to the CAM for Bedous Banking were always stated 
in the Generic CAM disclosure detail / Generic related audit procedure detail condition for 
comparative purposes24.  Participants viewed the audit reports within the online distribution 
platform and were also instructed to navigate to hyperlinks that would open the summary 
financial statements, notes to the financial statements, and the audit reports unique to their 
condition in separate windows for ease of access while answering the case questions25. 
                                                          
 
24 I determined for Bedous Banking to have a disclosed CAM in the same area as Aubrek Banking due to the 
PCAOB’s position that almost all audit reports will contain one or more CAMs; therefore, it was determined from a 
comparative standpoint that it would be more informative to compare two firms disclosing a CAM and for Bedous 
Banking CAM disclosure detail to remain constant in the Generic CAM Generic Audit Procedure condition 
reflective of the disclosure that would meet the minimum PCAOB standard.  Further, anecdotal evidence from the 
U.K. suggests that firms operating in the same industry will have critical audit matter disclosures in similar 
accounts, providing external validity to the experimental setting. 
25 Participants were allowed access to the summary financial statements, notes to the financial statements, and the 
auditor’s reports for both firms for the entirety of the case.  Once the case was completed, a screen appeared 
informing participants to close all tabs to the financial statements, notes to the financial statements, and the auditor’s 
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Following recent research by Gaynor et al. (2016) which suggests that financial reporting 
quality and audit quality are separate, yet related, constructs, I use several measures of perceived 
financial reporting quality and perceived audit quality to investigate how these proposed 
disclosures could impact each construct separately and utilize confirmatory factor analysis to 
confirm that factors are loading on the appropriate latent constructs (discussed in Section V. 
RESULTS).  After being exposed to the CAM and audit procedures manipulation contained 
within the audit report and opening up new windows displaying the summary financial 
statements, notes to the financial statements, and auditor’s reports for ease of access, participants 
were asked several questions26 with respect to the CAM account (provision for credit losses) and 
the non-CAM account (goodwill impairment27); these questions included: confidence in the 
reliability of the account, confidence in the accuracy of the account, and confidence that the 
account is free from bias (all measured on 7-point Likert scales with labels at 1=Very 
Unconfident, 4=Neither Confident nor Unconfident, and 7=Very Confident).  These confidence 
assessments were hypothesized to load on the construct CAM_ACCURACY_RELIABILITY in 
my process model.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
reports for both firms before proceeding to the post experimental questionnaire and manipulation check.  
Participants were required to positively affirm their compliance with the instructions before being allowed to 
proceed to the manipulation checks and PEQ. 
26 To control for potential order effects, all questions hypothesized to load on the latent constructs of 
CAM_ACCURACY, AUDIT_QUALITY, and FINANCIAL_REPORTING_QUALITY were randomized within 
their block.  Attention check questions were also placed within the block containing the case questions.  
Randomization of all case questions was chosen to provide additional validity to the factor loadings on the latent 
constructs with confirmatory factor analysis. 
27 Goodwill impairment was selected as a nonCAM account for evaluation due to the account often involving 
significant management judgment and testing before a final figure is determined.  Further, goodwill impairment has 
the high potential of being disclosed as a CAM accounting in and of itself as stated by the PCAOB (2016) and seen 
in key audit matter disclosures of U.K. firms. 
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Participants also answered several questions hypothesized to load on 
AUDIT_QUALITY28 in my process model, including: agreement that the auditor did a high 
quality job identifying the CAM, assessment of how well the auditor’s work would allow them to 
accurately identify a CAM, how independent the auditor was with respect to the firm’s 
management, how much effort the auditor performed with their audit procedures to address the 
CAM, how appropriate the auditor was in their response to address the CAM, their agreement 
that the auditor did a high quality job planning and performing the audit procedures that address 
the CAM, the overall competence of the auditor and their work, and the overall quality of the 
auditor’s work (all measured on 7-point Likert scales).  Additional measures of audit quality 
were captured on 7-point Likert scales (labels at 1=Completely Disagree, 4=Somewhat Agree, 
and 7=Completely Agree) including: agreement that the auditors on the engagement were 
competent, agreement that the audit engagement as a whole was of high quality, agreement with 
the auditor to give a clean audit opinion on the financial statements, and agreement that other 
auditors would have given the same opinion on the financial statements. 
For the hypothesized latent construct of FINANCIAL_REPORTING_QUALITY several 
questions were asked on a 7-point Likert scale (labels at 1=Strongly Disagree, 4=Neither Agree 
nor Disagree, and 7=Strongly Agree) including: agreement that the company’s financial 
statements accurately represent their performance, agreement that the company’s financial 
statements are reliable, agreement that the company’s financial statements are biased, and 
agreement that the company’s financial statements are a good indicator of future performance.  
                                                          
 
28 Following Doxey (2015), each question hypothesized to load on the latent construct AUDIT_QUALITY was 
asked with respect to both auditors (Auldley Hoffman, LLP and Darbron Hank, LLP) simultaneously to minimize 
the presence of any order effect. 
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Additional question were asked on a 101-point Likert scale (e.g. labels at 0=Very Objective, 
50=Neither Subjective nor Objective and 100=Very Objective), including: how subjective the 
values reported for the financial statements are as a whole, how uncertain the values reported for 
the financial statements are as a whole, and whole biased the values reported for the financial 
statements are as a whole. 
Participants also responded to question asking them to assess the likelihood that there 
was a material misstatement in the provision for credit losses account, the goodwill impairment 
account, and anywhere in the financial statements (all on 101-point Likert scales with labels at 
0=0%, 50=50% and 100=100%).  These measures served as a dependent variable of interest in 
my path analysis.   
Following the case questions, participants were informed that they had $100,000 to 
invest.  The total sum of $100,000 could be invested in Aubrek Banking (manipulated audit 
report) Bedous Banking (control audit report) or any combination of the two firms.  Participants 
were then asked how useful the audit report was for making their investment decision (7-point 
Likert scale with labels at 1=Totally Useless, 4=Neither Useful nor Useless, and 7=Very Useful), 
how difficult it was to understand the company’s financial statements, how difficult it was to 
understand the contents of the audit reports, how difficult it was to compare the financial 
statements between the two firms, and how difficult it was to compare the audit reports between 
the two firms (all on 7-point Likert scales with labels at 1=Very Difficult, 4=Neither Difficult 
nor Easy, and 7=Very Easy).  
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4.3 Manipulation Checks 
Participants then proceed to the manipulation check and post experiment questionnaire.  
Participants were explicitly instructed to close all tabs (financial statements, notes to the financial 
statements, and the auditor’s report) that had been opened during the case before proceeding to 
the manipulation check and were informed that failure to do so may result in forfeiture of 
compensation29.  A question requiring an affirmative response that the participant had closed all 
tabs was included to further ensure compliance.   
Following affirmation that all windows that had been opened during the experiment had 
been closed, participants were asked several questions to assess their retention of the case 
materials, including: if the auditor identified a CAM for Aubrek Banking (dichotomous question 
with choices Yes/No), if the auditor identified a CAM for Bedous Banking (dichotomous 
question with choices Yes/No), the opinion Aubrek Banking received from the auditor 
(trichotomous question with choices Unqualified/Qualified/Adverse), the opinion that Bedous 
Banking received from the auditor (trichotomous question with choices 
Unqualified/Qualified/Adverse), the account identified as a CAM for Aubrek Banking (Goodwill 
Impairment, Provision for Credit losses, Depreciation Expense, or None of the Above), and the 
account identified as a CAM for Bedous Banking (Goodwill impairment, Provision for credit 
losses, depreciation expense, or none of the above). Questions to assess the effectiveness of the 
manipulations included the following (all on 7-point Likert scales with labels at 1=Very Low 
Level of Detail, 4=Neither a Low nor High Level of Detail, and 7=Very High Level of Detail): 
                                                          
 
29 No participant was denied compensation for failing to close the tabs.  The presence of negative consequences was 
chosen to increase compliance with the instructions before proceeding to the manipulation check and to increase the 
validity of the results of the manipulation check.  However, I cannot say with certainty that participants followed the 
instructions to close all tabs nor can I identify those participants who failed to comply. 
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the level of detail used to describe the critical audit matter disclosure in the independent auditor’s 
report of Aubrek Banking, the level of detail used to describe the critical audit matter disclosure 
in the independent auditor’s report of Bedous Banking, the level of detail used to describe the 
audit procedures performed to respond to and address the disclosed CAM in the independent 
auditor’s report of Aubrek Banking, and the level of detail used to describe the audit procedures 
performed to respond to and address the disclosed CAM in the independent auditor’s report of 
Bedous Banking.   
4.4 Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
After answering questions to assess attention to the experimental materials and the 
effectiveness of the manipulations, participants were asked to respond to several questions acting 
as control variables.  To control for the possibility that participants perceived differential levels 
of information from the financial statements, participants were asked to assess: the difficulty of 
comparing the financial statements between both firms (7-point Likert scale with labels of 
1=Very Difficult, 4=Neither Easy no Difficult, and 7=Very Easy) and the difficulty of 
understanding the company’s financial statements as a whole (7-point Likert scale with labels of 
1=Very Difficult, 4=Neither Easy nor Difficult, and 7=Very Easy)30.  I further asked participants 
to assess the usefulness of the audit report for both firms (7-point Likert scale with labels of 
1=Totally Useless, 4=Neither Useful or Useless, and 7=Very Useful), the difficulty in 
understanding the contents of the company’s audit report for both firms (7-point Likert scale 
with labels of 1=Very Difficult, 4=Neither Easy nor Difficult, 7=Very Easy), and the difficulty 
                                                          
 
30 These measures were adopted from the instrument used in Doxey (2015) to provide evidence that there were no 
perceived differences in the usefulness or presentation of the financial statements. 
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of comparing the audit reports of the two firms (7-point Likert scale with labels of 1=Very 
Difficult, 4=Neither Easy nor Difficult, 7=Very Easy).   
To control for any differences in perceived readability, participants responded to three 
question for both Aubrek Banking and Bedous Banking (7-point Liker scale with labels at 
1=Very Difficult, 4=Neither Difficult nor Easy, and 7=Very Easy) that were adapted from Tan et 
al. (2014): how difficult it felt to read the auditor’s report, how difficult it was to understand the 
auditor’s report, how difficult it felt to process the information in the auditor’s report.  Finally, 
participants answered demographic questions before viewing a screen informing them that the 
survey had concluded and thanking them for their participation. 
  
49 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Participant Retention, Attention Tests, and Manipulation Checks 
 Amazon Mechanical Turk was engaged to recruit nonprofessional investor participants.  
191 participants31 completed the instrument and were compensated with $2.50.  Participants who 
completed the entire instrument took on average 27.92 minutes, resulting in an effective hourly 
wage of $5.37 for the entire population.  Six comprehension and manipulation checks were 
completed by participants and only participants who correctly answered all six questions were 
retained for the final analysis.  20 (10.5%) participants incorrectly responded that no CAM 
account was disclosed by the auditor for Aubrek Banking (9 participants incorrectly responded a 
CAM was disclosed for Aubrek Banking in the control condition, equivalent to 4.7% of the total 
sample). Two (11.5%) participants incorrectly responded that no CAM account was disclosed by 
the auditor for Bedous Banking (three participants incorrectly responded a CAM was disclosed 
for Aubrek Banking in the control condition, equivalent to 1.6% of the total sample).  Forty-
seven (24.6%) participants incorrectly identified the audit opinion that Aubrek Banking received 
and forty-seven (24.6%) participants incorrectly identified the audit opinion that Bedous Banking 
received.  Finally, forty-four (23%) of participants incorrectly identified the account that was 
disclosed as a CAM for Aubrek Banking and 38 (20%) participants incorrectly identified the 
account that was disclosed as a CAM for Bedous Banking.  
                                                          
 
31 Hypothesis testing with the full sample does not produce results that are inferentially synonymous with my 
constrained sample.  Therefore, the participants who fail the comprehension and attention check question are 
excluded from my analysis. 
50 
 
All participants who failed a manipulation or comprehension check were excluded from the final 
analysis, leaving 91 usable observations for hypotheses testing32. 
I tested the effectiveness of my manipulations by a series of one-way ANCOVAs .  A 
one-way ANCOVA with CAM_DETAIL as the manipulated IV, the level of detail in the CAM 
disclosure for Aubrek Banking as the DV, and the corresponding measure for Bedous Banking as 
the CV revealed significant differences between the levels of CAM disclosure detail 
(F(1,73)=2.617, p=.055, one-tailed, untabulated) suggesting that participants in the detailed 
condition perceived the CAM disclosure for Aubrek Banking to be more detailed than those 
participants in the generic condition.  Similarly, a one-way ANCOVA with AUDIT_DETAIL as 
the manipulated IV, the level of detail in the audit procedures disclosure for Aubrek Banking as 
the DV, and the corresponding measure for Bedous Banking as the CV revealed significant 
differences between the levels of audit procedure disclosure detail (F(1,73)=2.522, p=.059, one-
tailed, untabulated) suggesting that participants in the detailed condition perceived the audit 
disclosure to be more detailed for Aubrek Banking relative to those participants in the generic 
condition. 
5.2 Scale Validation 
Before I test hypotheses, I confirm that my dependent measures load on the theorized 
latent constructs.  Three items load on the latent construct of 
CAM_ACCURACY__RELIABILITY_A with a Cronbach’s Alpha of .901 indicating excellent 
internal consistency (Nunnaly 1967).  Thirteen items load on the latent construct of 
AUDIT_QUALITY_A with a Cronbach’s Alpha of .930 indicating excellent internal consistency 
                                                          
 
32 Given the conservative restrictions used to limit my sample size, it is very possible that my statistical results suffer 
from low power.  Given this potential limitation, I interpret my results as significant if they reach the α < .10 level. 
51 
 
(Nunnaly 1967).  Six items load on the latent construct of 
FINANCIAL_REPORTING_QUALITY_A with a Cronbach’s Alpha of .894 indicating good 
internal consistency.  All my measures have an alpha in excess of .80, suggesting good internal 
consistency.  I therefore conclude that the requisite conditions of reliability are satisfied.  Table 
2, Panel B presents the means, standard deviations, and unstandardized alpha score for each 
dependent measure used in a scale item.  
To validate the use of my participants in the present setting I first replicate the findings of 
Kachelmeier et al. (2016) by demonstrating confidence in the reliability of an account disclosed 
as a CAM is lower than the confidence in the reliability of an account not disclosed as a CAM.  
Goodwill impairment served as the non-CAM account and the provision for credit losses served 
as the CAM account across conditions; the only item manipulated was the description of the 
CAM account, provision for credit losses.  A paired means t-test comparing the mean confidence 
in an account that is not disclosed as a CAM, goodwill impairment, and the mean confidence of 
the account that is disclosed as a CAM, the provision for credit losses, was conducted to confirm 
prior empirical results.  The results of the test are significant (M=4.49 and M= 4.33 for non-
CAM and CAM account disclosure, respectively, the difference in means of .16 is marginally 
significant (t (90)=1.425, p<.079, one-tailed, untabulated).  This suggests that the disclosure of 
an account as a CAM results in a “disclaimer effect” that adversely impacts nonprofessional 
investors’ confidence in the account; this result is consistent with findings of contemporaneous 
studies (e.g. Kachelmeier et al. 2016, Christensen et al. 2014, Sirois et al. 2014).   
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TABLE 2 - Validation of Instrument 
Panel A: Case Questions Used 
CAM Reliability & Accuracy 
As an investor, how much confidence do you have in the ____________ of the values reported 
for the firm’s provision for credit losses account specifically? 
CRA1  Reliability 
CRA2  Accuracy 
CRA3  How confident are you that the values reported are free from bias? 
 
Assessed Audit Quality 
AQ1  How informative was the disclosure in the audit report that identified the CAM? 
AQ2  Please indicate your agreement with the following statement: The auditor did a high 
quality job in identifying the CAM. 
AQ3  Please indicate your agreement with the following statement: The auditor’s work would 
allow them to accurately identify the CAM while conducting the audit. 
AQ4  How independent do you believe the auditor is with respect to the firm’s management? 
AQ5  How much effort do you believe the auditor exerted with their audit procedures to address 
the firm’s CAM? 
AQ6  How appropriate do you believe the auditor was in their response to address the CAM 
detailed in the audit report? 
AQ7  Please indicate your agreement with the following:  The auditor did a high quality job in 
planning and performing the audit procedures that addressed the CAM. 
AQ8  How would you assess the overall competence of the auditor? 
AQ9  How would you assess the overall quality of the auditor’s work? 
AQ10  Please indicate your agreement with the following statement:  I believe that the 
auditor conducted a high quality audit of the firm. 
AQ11  Please indicate your agreement with the following statement: I believe that the auditors 
working at the auditing firm are competent. 
AQ12  Please indicate your agreement with the following statement: I agree with the 
auditor's decision to give the firm's financial statements a clean audit opinion. 
AQ13  Please indicate your agreement with the following statement: I believe other 
auditors would have given the same audit opinion on the firm's financial statements. 
 
Assessed Financial Reporting Quality 
As an investor, how much confidence do you have in the ____________ of the values reported 
for the firm’s income statement as a whole? 
FRQ1  Reliability 
FRQ2  Accuracy 
FRQ3  How confident are you that the values reported are free from bias? 
FRQ4  The company’s financial statement as a whole accurately represent their performance. 
FRQ5  The company’s financial statements as a whole are reliable. 
FRQ6  The company’s financial statements as a whole are a good indicator of future 
performance. 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Panel B 
Scale Item N 
Item 
Mean 
Item 
S.D. 
Min
. 
Max
. 
Standardized 
Alpha 
CRA1 76 4.45 1.509 1 7 0.840 
CRA2 76 4.13 1.552 1 7 0.849 
CRA3 76 4.22 1.502 1 7 0.885 
CAM Reliability & 
Accuracy           0.901 
AQ1 76 5.13 1.482 1 7 0.932 
AQ2 76 5.90 1.046 3 7 0.921 
AQ3 76 5.72 1.028 3 7 0.924 
AQ4 76 5.79 1.247 2 7 0.927 
AQ5 76 5.42 1.278 2 7 0.922 
AQ6 76 6.00 0.924 3 7 0.921 
AQ7 76 5.53 1.125 2 7 0.919 
AQ8 76 5.97 0.765 4 7 0.923 
AQ9 76 5.61 1.008 3 7 0.921 
AQ10 76 5.79 1.050 3 7 0.919 
AQ11 76 5.96 0.756 4 7 0.924 
AQ12 76 5.16 1.347 1 7 0.934 
AQ13 76 5.55 0.985 3 7 0.929 
     Assessed Audit Quality           0.939 
FRQ1 76 5.18 1.092 2 7 0.857 
FRQ2 76 5.20 1.059 2 7 0.855 
FRQ3 76 4.64 1.39 1 7 0.885 
FRQ4 76 5.17 1.112 1 7 0.864 
FRQ5 76 5.17 1.088 2 7 0.859 
FRQ6 76 4.72 1.302 1 7 0.925 
Assessed Financial   
Reporting Quality           0.904 
 
5.3 Test of Hypotheses 
5.3.1 Hypothesis One 
Descriptive statistics for all conditions (including control) may be found in Table A1.  I 
test my hypotheses using the manipulated conditions but not the control condition; since the 
control condition did not have a CAM disclosure in the audit report or related audit procedures 
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for Aubrek Banking, the firm of interest that contained the manipulation within the audit report, 
it is nonsensical to include it in a test that examines differences in the level of detail for a CAM 
disclosure and the related audit procedures.   
H1 stated that nonprofessional investors will have greater confidence in an account 
disclosed as a CAM in greater detail relative to an account disclosed as a CAM in generic detail. 
To test H1, a two-way MANCOVA was conducted with CAM_DETAIL (coded as 1=Detailed, 
2=Generic) and AUDIT_DETAIL (coded as 1=Detailed, 2=Generic) as the independent 
variables, assessments of CAM reliability and CAM accuracy for Aubrek Banking as the 
dependent variables of interest, and assessments of CAM reliability and CAM accuracy for 
Bedous Banking (the unmanipulated firm presented for comparative purposes) as covariates.  
The MANCOVA (TABLE 3, PANEL D) shows that CAM_DETAIL impacts participants’ 
perceptions of the CAM account’s accuracy (F(1,70)=1.85, p=.08933) and reliability (F(1, 
70)=2.583, p=.0565).  Reviewing the pattern of means reveals that nonprofessional investors 
have greater confidence in the reliability of a CAM account that is disclosed in greater detail.  
This result is consistent with my expectations; the results are follow the predictions of the 
boundary condition of Support Theory where additional supporting evidence, when disclosed in 
greater detail, will decrease assessments of the parent hypothesis, in this case that the CAM 
account in unreliable.  This results in an increase in the assessments of account accuracy and 
reliability, providing support for H1. 
                                                          
 
33 Consistent with directional hypotheses, reported p-values are one-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
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Table A1:  Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables and Covariates 
   
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
   
        
  
  
CAM Detail: Detailed Generic 
  
  
Audit Detail: Detailed Generic Detailed Generic Control Overall 
VARIABLES n=21 n=17 n=17 n=21 n=15 n=76 
     Dependent Measures 
     
  
CAM Accuracy (Aubrek) 3.62 4.00 4.41 4.52 4.64 4.23 
  
  
(1.83) (1.41) (1.50) (1.33) (1.45) (1.54) 
CAM Reliability (Aubrek) 3.90 4.53 4.41 4.95 4.64 4.45 
  
  
(1.76) (1.28) (1.50) (1.32) (1.60) (1.52) 
Assessed Audit Quality 
(Aubrek) 5.71 5.62 5.25 5.90 4.60 5.49 
  
  
(0.69) (0.91) (0.97) (0.60) (1.37) (0.99) 
Assessed Financial 
Reporting Quality (Aubrek) 4.78 5.20 4.90 5.26 4.99 5.02 
  
  
(1.25) (0.81) (0.98) (0.62) (1.23) (1.00) 
Investment (Aubrek) 56555.86 49007.12 48235.94 51988.57 63449.79 53526 
      (13598.23) (10361.08) (8486.66) (11054.51) (31249.20) (16385) 
     Covariate Measures             
CAM Accuracy (Bedous) 3.29 4.00 4.47 4.52 4.14 4.09 
  
  
(1.62) (1.32) (1.50) (1.36) (0.95) (1.45) 
CAM Reliability (Bedous) 3.7143 4.47 4.47 5.05 4.14 4.40 
  
  
(1.62) (1.28) (1.42) (1.32) (1.10) (1.43) 
Assessed Audit Quality 
(Bedous) 5.41 5.64 5.19 5.93 5.27 5.53 
  
  
(0.63) (0.84) (0.93) (0.60) (1.16) (0.86) 
Assessed Financial 
Reporting Quality (Bedous) 4.70 5.21 4.87 5.24 4.46 4.90 
  
  
(1.20) (0.80) (0.97) (0.75) (1.18) (1.02) 
Accounting Classes 3.85 4.29 7.59 4.19 3.86 4.69 
  
  
(5.08) (4.82) (6.62) (4.63) (5.48) (5.37) 
Auditor Objectivity 5.86 5.71 5.24 5.86 5.71 5.70 
  
  
(0.73) (1.10) (1.25) (1.39) (1.20) (1.15) 
Audit Report Information 4.62 3.47 3.76 4.00 1.57 3.65 
      (1.56) (1.50) (1.48) (1.26) (1.09) (1.69) 
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Table 3 - MANCOVA Results for CAM Accuracy 
and Reliability with AUDIT_DETAIL and 
CAM_DETAIL 
Panel A - Cell Means (Standard Deviation) for 
CAM Accuracy 
  
Related Audit 
Procedures Disclosure 
Detail 
Detailed Generic 
CAM 
Disclosure 
Detail 
Detailed 4.39  (.126) 
4.04  
(.134) 
Generic 4.05  (.137) 
4.01  
(.124) 
 
Panel B - Cell Means (Standard Deviation) 
for CAM Reliability 
  
Related Audit 
Procedures 
Disclosure Detail 
Detailed Generic 
CAM 
Disclosure 
Detail 
Detailed 4.59 (.104) 
4.74 
(.111) 
Generic 4.39 (.113) 
4.33 
(.103) 
 
Panel C - Two-Way MANCOVA Results 
  Value F Sig. 
CAM_RELIABLE_BEDOUS - Wilks' 
Lambda .154 190.247 .001 
CAM_ACCURATE_BEDOUS - Wilks' 
Lambda .232 114.360 .001 
CAM - Wilks' Lambda 0.04 1.422 0.248 
AUDIT - Wilks' Lambda 0.032 0.416 0.327 
CAM*AUDIT 0.024 0.866 0.425 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Panel D - Two-Way MANCOVA Results 
DV:  CAM_ACCURACY 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CAM 0.567 1 0.567 1.85 0.089 
AUDIT 0.705 1 0.705 2.302 0.067 
CAM*AUDIT 0.463 1 0.463 1.512 0.112 
ERROR 21.433 70 0.306 
 
  
Total 1478 76       
 
DV:  CAM_RELIABILITY 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CAM 0.541 1 0.541 2.583 0.0565 
AUDIT 0.143 1 0.143 0.681 0.412 
CAM*AUDIT 0.017 1 0.017 0.081 0.777 
ERROR 14.667 71 0.210 
 
  
Total 1674 76       
 
  
Figure 4:  Mean Plots of CAM Account Accuracy 
CAM – Level of CAM disclosure detail, coded as 1=Detailed and 0=Generic 
AUDIT – Level of related audit procedure disclosure detail, coded as 1=Detailed and  
      0=Generic 
CAM_ACCURACY – Confidence in the accuracy of the disclosed CAM accounting (7-point  
Likert scale with labels at 1=Very Unconfident, 4=Not Confident nor 
Unconfident, 7=Very Confident) 
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 Figure 5:  Mean Plots of CAM Account Reliability 
 CAM – Level of CAM disclosure detail, coded as 1=Detailed and 0=Generic 
 AUDIT – Level of related audit procedure disclosure detail, coded as 1=Detailed and  
 0=Generic 
 CAM_RELIABILITY – Confidence in the reliability of the disclosed CAM accounting (7- 
 point Likert scale with labels at 1=Very Unconfident,  
 4=Not Confident nor Unconfident, 7=Very Confident) 
 
5.3.2 Hypothesis Two 
H2 predicts that nonprofessional investors will be more confident in the accuracy and 
reliability of an account disclosed as a CAM when the audit procedures engaged to address the 
CAM are disclosed in more greater detail relative to a CAM disclosed in generic detail.  To test 
H2, I review the results of the MANCOVA conducted in H1.   
The results of the MANCOVA are significant for AUDIT_DETAIL when the DV is 
CAM_ACCURACY (F(1,70)=2.302, p=.067) but nonsignificant when the DV is 
CAM_RELIABILITY (F(1,70)=.0681, p=.412).  This result (Table 3, Panel D) suggests that 
nonprofessional investors’ have greater confidence in the accuracy of an account disclosed as a 
CAM when the audit procedures engaged to address the account are disclosed in greater detail 
relative to a disclosure where the related audit procedures are disclosed in generic detail.  Again, 
this is consistent with my predictions using the boundary condition of Support Theory; the more 
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supporting specific pieces of evidence the auditor provides for their related audit procedures in 
the audit report, the greater confidence nonprofessional investors have in the accuracy of that 
account.  The results provide partial support for H2. 
5.3.3 Hypothesis Three 
 H3 predicts that nonprofessional investors will assess audit quality higher when the 
related audit procedures are disclosed in greater detail relative to when the related audit 
procedures are disclosed in generic detail.  A two-way ANCOVA is used to test H3 with 
AUDIT_DETAIL and CAM_DETAIL as the independent variables (1=Detailed, 2=Generic) and 
the average of 13 dependent measures of audit quality for Aubrek Banking as the dependent 
variable of interest34, and the average of 13 corresponding measures of audit quality for Bedous 
Banking as a covariate. 
Table 4 - ANCOVA Results for Assessed Audit 
Quality with AUDIT_DETAIL and CAM_DETAIL 
Panel A - Cell Means (Standard Deviation) for 
Assessments of Audit Quality 
  
Related Audit 
Procedures Disclosure 
Detail 
Detailed Generic 
CAM Disclosure 
Detail 
Detailed 5.84  (0.69) 
5.54  
(0.91) 
Generic 5.58  (0.97) 
5.57 
(0.60) 
                                                          
 
34 Confirmatory factor analysis suggests that these 13 dependent measures load on the same latent construct 
(Cronbach’s Alpha=.930) indicating very high internal consistency and suggesting that the factors do indeed load on 
the same latent construct. 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Panel B - Two-Way ANCOVA Results 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CAM 0.269 1 0.269 1.619 0.1035 
AUDIT 0.416 1 0.416 2.503 0.059 
CAM*AUDIT 0.369 1 0.369 2.224 0.07 
ERROR 11.79 71 0.166 
 
  
Total 2467.33 76       
 
The results of the ANCOVA (Table 4, Panel B) are significant (F(1, 71)=2.503, p=.059) 
suggesting that nonprofessional investors perceive greater levels of audit quality when a CAM is 
disclosed with more detailed related auditor procedures relative to when a CAM is disclosed with 
generic related audit procedures.  However, this result should be interpreted in light of the 
significant interaction between CAM*AUDIT (F(1,71)=2.224, p=.07) which suggests that CAM 
disclosure detail interacts with audit disclosure detail to impact assessments of audit quality; 
specifically, CAM disclosures made with greater detail and audit procedures disclosed in greater 
detail result in the highest assessments of audit quality.  This result is consistent with the 
predictions Support Theory that states when more pieces of supporting evidence are provided to 
an individual, that individual will assess the probability of the parent hypothesis higher, therefore 
resulting in higher perceptions of audit quality.  This result provides support for H3. 
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 Figure 6:  Mean Plots of Assessments of Audit Quality 
 CAM – Level of CAM disclosure detail, coded as 1=Detailed and 0=Generic 
 AUDIT – Level of related audit procedure disclosure detail, coded as 1=Detailed and  
 0=Generic 
ASSESSMENTS OF AUDIT QUALITY – The average of 13 dependent measures of audit quality 
for Aubrek Banking 
 
5.3.4 Hypothesis Four 
H4 predicts that nonprofessional investors will assess financial reporting quality 
probability higher when the related audit procedures are disclosed in greater detail relative to 
generic detail in the auditor’s report.  To test H4, I conduct a two-way ANCOVA with 
AUDIT_DETAIL and CAM_DETAIL as the independent variables (1=Detailed, 2=Generic).  
The dependent variable of interest is the average of six dependent measures hypothesized and 
confirmed to load on the latent construct, assessed financial reporting quality for Aubrek 
Banking.  The corresponding six dependent measures of assessed financial reporting quality for 
Bedou Banking acts as a covariate 
 The results of the ANCOVA are not significant (F(1,71)=0.96, p=.758) (Table 5, Panel 
B).  These results suggest that nonprofessional investors do not assess financial reporting quality 
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higher when the audit procedures are disclosed in greater detail and the corresponding 
assessments for the control firm are accounted for, failing to provide support for H4. 
 
 
Table 5 - ANCOVA Results for Assessed Financial Reporting Quality 
with AUDIT_DETAIL and CAM_DETAIL 
Panel A - Cell Means (Standard Deviation) for Assessments of Financial 
Reporting Quality 
  
Related Audit Procedures Disclosure Detail 
Detailed Generic 
CAM Disclosure 
Detail 
Detailed 4.71 (1.24) 4.90 (0.98) 
Generic 5.20 (0.81) 5.26 (0.62) 
 
Panel B - Two-Way ANCOVA Results 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CAM 0.01 1 0.01 0.315 0.577 
AUDIT 0.032 1 0.032 0.096 0.758 
CAM*AUDIT 0.063 1 0.063 0.628 0.431 
ERROR 7.165 71 0.101 
 
  
Total 1979.972 76       
 
5.3.5 Hypothesis 5a 
To test Hypothesis 5a, 5b, 6a, 6b, 7, and 8, I develop a structural equation model (SEM).  
The model fit of the hypothesized model in Figure One is poor (χ2(13)=41.867, p<.001, 
CFI=0.709, RMSEA=.171) leading me to modify the model.  Byrne (2010) states that the chi-
square statistic should be insignificant (although a significant chi-square can be overlooked with 
when other fit statistics are acceptable due to its sensitivity to sample size), CFI should be > 0.9, 
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and RMSEA should be < 0.06.  After reviewing the modification indices, I included three 
unhypothesized paths: a path from CAM, AUDIT, and CAM*AUDIT to INVEST.  This model 
fits my data well (χ2(25)=124.301, p<.001, CFI=0.991, RMSEA=.031).   
Table 6 - Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Perception 
Factors 
Factor Items Cronbach's Alpha 
    Raw Standardized 
CAM Reliability/Accuracy 3 0.901 0.901 
Assessed Audit Quality 13 0.930 0.939 
Assessed Financial 
Reporting Quality 6 0.894 0.904 
 
Hypothesis 5a states that nonprofessional investors’ confidence in the accuracy and 
reliability of a CAM account will positively mediate the relationship between CAM disclosure 
language and assessments of financial reporting quality.  The path coefficient from CAM to 
CAM_ACCURACY_RELIABILITY is significant (β=2.339, p=.045), and the path coefficient 
from CAM_ACCURACY_RELIABILITY to FRQ is significant (β=-2.170, p<.001) suggesting 
mediation.  The path coefficient from CAM to FRQ is not significant (p=.953) suggesting full 
mediation.  The total indirect effect of CAM on FRQ is β=-5.08.  While these results are 
significant, they are in the opposite direction of H5a.  Therefore, the results do not provide 
support for H5a. 
5.3.6 Hypothesis 5b 
Hypothesis 5b states that nonprofessional investors’ assessment of audit quality will 
positively mediate the relationship between audit procedure disclosure language and assessed 
financial reporting quality.  The path coefficient from AUDIT to AUDIT_QUALITY is 
marginally significant (β=0.275, p=.075, one-tailed) and the path coefficient from 
AUDIT_QUALITY to FRQ is significant (β=-1.365, p=.033, one-tailed) suggesting mediation.  
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The path coefficient from AUDIT to FRQ is not significant (p=.942) suggesting full mediation.  
The total indirect effect of AUDIT on FRQ is β= -0.375.  Again, while these results are 
significant, they are contradictory to my predictions for H5b.  Therefore, the results provide do 
not provide support for H5b. 
5.3.7 Hypothesis 6a and 6b 
Hypothesis 6a states that nonprofessional investors’ confidence in the accuracy and 
reliability of a CAM account will negatively mediate the relationship between CAM disclosure 
language and assessed probability of material misstatement.  The path coefficient from CAM to 
CAM_ACCURACY_RELIABILITY is significant (β=2.339, p=.045, one-tailed).  The path 
coefficient from CAM_ACCURACY_RELIABILITY to MISSTATEMENT is significant (β=-
10.324, p=.007, one-tailed) suggesting mediation.  The path coefficient from CAM to 
MISSTATEMENT is insignificant (p=.979) suggesting full mediation.  The total, indirect effect 
of CAM on MISSTATEMENT is calculated as β=-24.15.  These results provide support for H6a. 
Hypothesis 6b states that nonprofessional investors’ assessments of audit quality will 
negatively mediate the relationship between audit procedures disclosure language and assessed 
probability of material misstatement.  The path coefficient from AUDIT to AUDIT_QUALITY 
is marginally significant (β=0.275, p=.065, one-tailed).  The path coefficient from 
AUDIT_QUALITY to MISSTATEMENT is marginally significant (β=14.522, p=.075, one-
tailed).  Finally the path coefficient from AUDIT to MISSTATEMENT is not significant 
(p=.736) suggesting full mediation.  Despite marginal levels of significance, these results are in 
the opposing direction of H6b predictions.  Therefore, the results fail to support H6b. 
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5.3.8 Hypothesis 7 & 8 
Hypothesis 7 states that nonprofessional investors’ assessments of financial reporting 
quality will negatively impact their assessed misstatement probability.  The path coefficient from 
FRQ to MISSTATEMENT is significant (β=7.243, p=.001) but is opposite the predicted 
direction, failing to provide support for H7. 
Finally, Hypothesis 8 states that nonprofessional investors’ assessment of misstatement 
probability will negatively impact their decision to invest in the target firm and the magnitude of 
their investment.  The path coefficient from MISSTATE to INVEST is not significant (p=.635) 
failing to provide support for H8. 
Interpreted together, the results of the path model suggest that the effect of CAM 
disclosure detail on assessments of financial reporting quality are fully mediated by confidence 
in the accuracy and reliability of the CAM account.  In turn, the effect of confidence in the 
accuracy and reliability of the CAM account on assessments of misstatement probability are 
partially mediated through assessments of financial reporting quality; the full effect of 
CAM_ACCURACY_RELIABILITY on MISSTATEMENT is negative which suggests that as 
nonprofessional investors grow more confident in the accuracy and reliability of the CAM 
account as disclosure detail increase, they assess the likelihood of misstatement to be lower, 
consistent with the boundary condition of Support Theory.  Similar inferences may be drawn 
from the mediation of AUDIT on FRQ and MISSTATEMENT through AUDIT_QUALITY.  
Overall, these results are informative in demonstrating how nonprofessional investors arrive at 
their assessments of financial reporting quality and misstatement.  Further, the results show that 
the effect of CAM disclosure detail and audit procedure disclosure detail are fully mediated 
through assessments of CAM accuracy/reliability and audit quality respectively.  Finally, the 
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results are consistent with the boundary condition of Support Theory, where CAM disclosures 
and audit procedures disclosers that are made in greater detail decrease nonprofessional 
investors’ assessments that a material misstatement is present in the financial statements. 
Table 7 - SEM Results 
Panel A - Selected Path Coefficients 
Link 
Path 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
p (one-
tailed) 
CAM ---> CAM_A_R 2.339 1.375 0.045 
AUDIT ---> CAM_A_R 1.216 0.840 0.075 
AUDIT ---> AUDIT_QUALITY 0.275 0.182 0.065 
CAM_A_R ---> FRQ -2.17 0.425 0.001 
CAM_A_R ---> MISSTATEMENT -10.324  2.133 0.001 
AUDIT_QUALITY ---> FRQ -1.365 0.742 0.033 
FRQ ---> MISSTATEMENT 1.266 0.458 0.006 
CAM ---> INVESTMENT -3.103 1.314 0.018 
AUDIT ---> INVESTMENT -1.891 0.81 0.020 
CAM*AUDIT ---> INVESTMENT 1.134 0.515 0.028 
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Figure 7:  Test of Hypothesized Model35 
 
 
                                                          
 
35 Only parameters reported in the model diagrams are path coefficients. 
FRQ 
 
AUDIT_QUALITY 
AUDIT INVESTMENT 
 
CAM CAM_A_R 
 
MISSTATEMENT NS 
-2.413** 
NS 
0.275*
 
 
-1.700*** 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
Variable Definitions: 
CAM – Level of CAM disclosure detail, coded as 1=Detailed and 0=Generic 
AUDIT – Level of related audit procedure disclosure detail, coded as 1=Detailed and 0=Generic 
CAM*AUDIT – Interaction term of CAM and AUDIT 
CAM_A_R – Assessed confidence in the CAM account’s accuracy and reliability as the average of three dependent measures on 7-point 
Likert scales 
FRQ – Assessed financial reporting quality as the average of six dependent measures on 7-point Likert scales 
AUDIT_QUALITY – Assessed audit quality as the average of 13 dependent measures on 7-point Likert scales 
MISSTATEMENT – Post manipulation difference measure of assessed likelihood of misstatement anywhere in the financial statements on 
a 101-point Likert scale 
INVESTMENT – Post Manipulation difference measure of investment in Aubrek Banking; $0-$100,000, inclusive 
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 Figure 8:  Results of Best Fit Model 
  
 
Significant (one-tailed) at the:  
*=.10 level 
**=.05 level 
***=.01 level 
FRQ 
 
AUDIT_QUALITY 
AUDIT INVESTMENT 
 
CAM CAM_A_R 
 
MISSTATEMENT 
-1.365** 
0.275*
 
 
-1.700*** 
-10.324*** 
CAM*AUDIT 
1.266*** 
-3.103*** 
-1.891*** 
1.134*** 
1.216* 
2.339** 
69 
 
6. SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS 
6.1 Controlling for Joint Assessments 
The results of my primary analysis may be the result of a joint assessment of both Aubrek 
(manipulated firm) and Bedous (control firm).  To address this concern, I conduct several sets of 
supplementary testing with a difference variable computed from the difference in assessments 
between Aubrek Banking and Bedous Banking. 
The tests of H1, H2, H3, and H4 are re-examined using the methodology described 
above.  I conduct supplemental analysis of H1 with a two-way MANOVA; CAM_DETAIL and 
AUDIT_DETAIL are the independent variables and the difference in CAM accuracy and 
reliability assessments between Aubrek Banking and Bedous Banking are the dependent 
variables of interest.  The results are significant for CAM_DETAIL when the dependent measure 
is CAM reliability (F(1,72)=3.686, p=.0295) and are significant when the dependent measure is 
CAM accuracy (F(1,72)=2.203, p=.071).  These results are consistent with my primary analysis 
and provide additional support for H1. 
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Table 8 - MANOVA Results for CAM Accuracy and Reliability with 
AUDIT_DETAIL and CAM_DETAIL 
Panel A - Cell Means (Standard Deviation) for CAM Accuracy 
  
Related Audit Procedures 
Disclosure Detail 
Detailed Generic 
CAM Disclosure Detail Detailed .33 (0.73) 0.00 (0.50) Generic -0.06 (0.43) 0.00 (0.55) 
 
Panel B- Cell Means (Standard Deviation) for CAM Reliability 
  
Related Audit Procedures 
Disclosure Detail 
Detailed Generic 
CAM Disclosure Detail Detailed 0.19 (0.51) 0.06 (0.43) Generic -0.06 (0.43) -0.10 (0.44) 
 
Panel C - Two-Way MANCOVA Results 
  Value F Sig. 
CAM - Wilks' Lambda 0.948 1.933 0.152 
AUDIT - Wilks' Lambda 0.984 0.565 0.571 
CAM*AUDIT - Wilks' Lambda 0.967 1.194 0.309 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
Panel D - Two-Way MANOVA Results 
DV:  CAM_ACCURACY_DIFF 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CAM 0.722 1 0.722 2.203 0.071 
AUDIT 0.354 1 0.354 1.08 0.302 
CAM*AUDIT 0.722 1 0.722 2.203 0.071 
ERROR 23.608 72 0.328 
 
  
Total 26 76       
      DV:  CAM_RELIABILITY_DIFF 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CAM 0.764 1 0.764 3.686 0.0295 
AUDIT 0.133 1 0.133 0.64 0.426 
CAM*AUDIT 0.043 1 0.043 0.205 0.652 
ERROR 14.93 72 0.207 
 
  
Total 16 76       
 
Supplemental analysis of H2 is tested similarly to methodology used to supplement H1 
using the same MANOVA results.  Unfortunately, the results are not significant for either CAM 
accuracy (F(1,72)=1.08, p=.302) or CAM reliability (F(1,72)=0.64, p=.426) failing to provide 
supplemental support for H2. 
Next, I conduct supplemental analysis on H3 by controlling for assessments of the control 
firm.  A two-way ANOVA with AUDIT_DETAIL as the independent variable and the difference 
in assessments of audit quality between Aubrek Banking and Bedous Banking is significant 
(F(1,72)=4.453, p=.019).  The pattern of means conforms to the predictions of H3.  When 
AUDIT_DETAIL is detailed, nonprofessional investors assess audit quality to be higher relative 
to when AUDIT_DETAIL is generic.  These results are consistent with Support Theory, where 
more pieces of supporting evidence result in higher probability assessments in the parent 
hypothesis (e.g. that audit quality is high). 
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Table 9 - ANOVA Results for Audit Quality 
Differences with AUDIT_DETAIL and 
CAM_DETAIL 
Panel A - Cell Means (Standard Deviation) for 
Audit Quality Difference 
  
Related Audit 
Procedures Disclosure 
Detail 
Detailed Generic 
CAM 
Disclosure 
Detail 
Detailed 0.30 (0.63) 0.05 (0.23) 
Generic -0.02 (0.21) 
-0.03 
(0.35) 
 
Panel B - Two-Way ANOVA Results 
DV:  AUDIT_QUALITY_DIFF 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CAM 0.83 1 0.283 1.682 0.10 
AUDIT 0.749 1 0.749 4.453 0.019 
CAM*AUDIT 
0.269 1 0.269 1.601 0.105 
ERROR 12.108 72 0.168 
 
  
Total 14.03 76       
 
Finally, I conduct supplemental testing of H4.  I conduct a two-way ANOVA with 
CAM_DETAIL and AUDIT_DETAIL as the independent variables and the difference in 
financial reporting quality assessments between Aubrek Banking and Bedous Banking as the 
dependent variable of interest.  The results (un-tabulated) are not significant (F(1,72)=.929, 
p=.338) failing to provide supplemental support for H4. 
6.2  Supplemental Analysis of Investment Decisions 
I further investigate whether my manipulated independent variables have any impact on 
nonprofessional investors’ investment decisions.  The results of the path analysis suggest that 
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there is an impact of CAM disclosure detail and related audit procedure disclosure detail on 
investment in Aubrek Banking (the manipulated firm). 
I conduct a two-way ANOVA with CAM_DETAIL and AUDIT_DETAIL as the 
manipulated independent variables and investment in Aubrek Banking the dependent variable of 
interest.  The ANOVA reveals a significant CAM_DETAIL*AUDIT_DETAIL interaction 
(F(1,72)=4.793, .032).  Simple effects analysis reveals that when CAM_DETAIL is detailed, 
nonprofessional investors invest significant more when the related audit procedures are disclosed 
in greater relative to generic detail (M=56555.86 and M=49007.12 respectively; the difference of 
8319.92 is significant, p=.026).  This is an interesting result that suggests nonprofessional 
investors find value when the level of detail for the CAM and related audit procedures 
disclosures converge at the same level.  The practical implications of this result suggest that if 
the auditor is going to disclose either a CAM account or the related audit procedures in detailed 
language, nonprofessional investors find the most value or information when the two disclosures 
converge at the same level in greater detail.  This result should encourage regulators who fear 
that these disclosures may become boilerplate (PCAOB 2016).  Evidence that greater detail 
results in additional value to nonprofessional investors that leads to an increased willingness to 
invest in the target firm could also be seized upon by management.  When a CAM is required to 
be disclosed, management may be motivated to influence the auditor to disclose the CAM in 
greater detail as this action would result in the greatest benefit for the firm itself. 
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Table 10 - ANOVA Results for Investment 
Judgment 
Panel A - Cell Means (Standard Deviation) for 
Investment Judgment 
  
Related Audit 
Procedures Disclosure 
Detail 
Detailed Generic 
CAM 
Disclosure 
Detail 
Detailed 56555.86 (13598.23) 
49007.12 
(10361.08) 
Generic 48235.94 (8486.66) 
51988.57 
(11054.51) 
 
Panel B - Two-Way ANOVA Results 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CAM 5999952396 1 133871141.100 1.070 .305 
AUDIT 9012285604 1 67691171.110  .541  .464 
CAM*AUDIT 15012238000 1 599952395.700   4.793 .032  
Error 9012285604 72 125170633.400   
Total 2.133x1011 76    
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 Figure 9:  Investment In Aubrek Banking 
 CAM – Level of CAM disclosure detail, coded as 1=Detailed and 0=Generic 
 AUDIT – Level of related audit procedure disclosure detail, coded as 1=Detailed and  
 0=Generic 
 INVESTMENT – Post Manipulation difference measure of investment in Aubrek Banking; $0- 
 $100,000, inclusive 
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7. DISCUSSION 
 The objective of this dissertation as a whole is to investigate how expanding the standard 
audit report will impact nonprofessional investors’ confidence in disclosed accounts, assessments 
of audit quality, assessments of financial reporting quality, and investment judgments.  
Specifically, I investigate how the PCAOB’s re-proposed standard and the associated principles-
based framework could be applied to the expanded audit report and how this expansion impacts 
nonprofessional investors’ perception.  Figure 10 provides a summary of the results of the tests 
of my hypotheses as well as references to the corresponding tables and figures. 
7.1  The Effect of CAM Disclosure Detail 
 The level of detail included in the CAM disclosure appears to impact nonprofessional 
investors’ assessments of the CAM accounts’ accuracy and reliability.  Hypothesis one states that 
nonprofessional investors will be more confident in the accuracy and reliability of the CAM 
account when the CAM account is identified with greater detail in the auditor’s report relative to 
when a CAM account is identified with generic detail.  H1 is supported with statistical tests.  
This result would suggest that the confidence in the accuracy and reliability of accounts that are 
disclosed as a CAM increases when the CAM account is disclosed in greater detail.  This result 
is consistent with the boundary condition of Support Theory which state that as an individual 
unpacks pieces of supporting evidence, their assessments of the parent hypothesis, in this case 
that the CAM account is not accurate or reliable, decreases with additional specific and atypical 
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evidence, resulting in higher assessments of accuracy and reliability.  These results may 
encourage regulators who wish for the audit report to be more informative and useful for 
investors.  It would appear that nonprofessional investors do indeed use the additional 
information within the report and find it useful; more detailed disclosures result in higher 
confidence judgments which may incentivize the auditor to produce more client tailored audit 
reports. 
7.2  The Effect of Related Audit Procedures Disclosure Detail 
The level of detail included in the related audit procedures also appears to impact 
nonprofessional investors’ assessments of the CAM accounts’ accuracy, but not assessments of 
reliability.  Hypothesis two states that nonprofessional investors will be more confident in the 
accuracy and reliability of the CAM account when the related audit procedures are disclosed in 
greater detail within the auditor’s report relative to when the related audit procedures are 
disclosed in generic detail within the auditor’s report.  H2 is supported with statistical tests.  This 
result would suggest that the confidence in the accuracy of accounts that are disclosed as a CAM 
increases when the related audit procedures engaged to address the CAM account are disclosed 
in greater detail.  This result is consistent with the boundary condition of Support Theory which 
states that as an individual unpacks pieces of specific supporting evidence, their assessments of 
the parent hypothesis, in this case that the CAM account is not accurate, decreases, resulting in 
higher assessments of accuracy.  Again, this result may encourage regulators who wish for the 
audit report to be more informative and useful.  It would appear that nonprofessional investors do 
indeed use the additional information within the report and find it useful; more detailed 
disclosures result in higher confidence judgments which may incentivize the auditor provide 
information specific to the client firm in the audit report. 
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The effect of related audit procedure disclosure detail on assessments of audit quality was 
also captured.  Hypothesis three states that nonprofessional investors will assess audit quality 
higher when the related audit procedures are described in greater detail within the auditor’s 
report relative to when the related audit procedures are described in generic detail within the 
auditor’s report.  H3 is supported with statistical tests.  It would appear that the description of the 
related audit procedures does impact nonprofessional investors’ assessment of audit quality; 
more detailed descriptions of the related audit procedures results in significantly higher 
assessments of audit quality relative to generic descriptions of related audit procedures.  This 
result is consistent with the intuitive predictions of Support Theory.  As regulators develop the 
final rule for promulgation, this result may ease practitioners’ fear of decreasing perceptions of 
audit quality if the objective of the new standard is indeed to provide detailed disclosures for 
every firm. 
7.3  SEM Results and Inferences 
The results of my SEM model provide interesting insight into the process through which 
nonprofessional investors incorporate the information contained within CAM disclosures and 
related audit procedures into their assessments.  Hypothesis 5a states that nonprofessional 
investors’ confidence in the accuracy and reliability of a CAM account will positively mediate 
the relationship between CAM disclosure language and assessments of financial reporting 
quality.  The results of the path analysis are significant and indicative of full mediation; however, 
the path coefficient for the total indirect effect is negative, suggesting that more detailed CAM 
disclosures actually decrease assessments of financial reporting quality. 
Hypothesis 5b states that nonprofessional investors’ assessment of audit quality will 
positively mediate the relationship between audit procedure disclosure language and assessed 
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financial reporting quality.  Similar to H5a, the path analysis is significant and suggests full 
mediation.  However, the total indirect effect of AUDIT on FRQ is negative, suggesting that 
related audit procedures disclosed in greater detail decrease assessments of audit quality.  Taken 
together, the results of H5a and H5b may discourage auditors from providing CAM disclosures 
that are highly specific to the client firm which would be counter to the objectives of the PCAOB 
and the desires of the investing public.  
Hypothesis 6a states that nonprofessional investors’ confidence in the accuracy and 
reliability of a CAM account will negatively mediate the relationship between CAM disclosure 
language and assessed probability of material misstatement.  The results of the path analysis 
support this position where the total indirect effect of CAM disclosure detail negatively impacts 
assessments of future misstatement; in other words, when nonprofessional investors have greater 
confidence in the accuracy and reliability of the CAM account, they assess a lower probability of 
misstatement in the financial statements. 
Hypothesis 6b states that nonprofessional investors’ assessments of audit quality will 
negatively mediate the relationship between audit procedures disclosure language and assessed 
probability of material misstatement.  The results of the path model are significant, but in the 
unhypothesized direction.  These results suggest that the disclosure more detailed audit 
procedures leads to higher assessments of future material misstatement.  This result is not totally 
surprising; when audit procedures are disclosed in greater detail it may communicate to 
nonprofessional investors that they auditor had to exert greater effort on a subjective and 
uncertain account.  Despite the auditor’s best efforts, the account may still be uncertain and 
subjective, leading to higher probability assessments of misstatements 
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Hypothesis 7 states that nonprofessional investors’ assessments of financial reporting 
quality will negatively impact their assessed misstatement probability.  The path coefficient from 
FRQ to MISSTATEMENT is significant but was opposite the predicted direction. Finally, 
Hypothesis 8 states that nonprofessional investors’ assessment of misstatement probability will 
negatively impact their decision to invest in the target firm and the magnitude of their 
investment.  The results of the path model do not provide support for H8; however, a 
supplementary ANOVA does find evidence that CAM disclosure detail interacting with related 
audit procedure disclosure detail does have a significant, positive impact on nonprofessional 
investors’ investment decisions.  This finding will be of interest to regulators and audit client 
management.  This result could incentivize client management to influence the language within 
the CAM disclosure to make the firm appear to be a more attractive investment; however, 
auditors may not acquiesce to this request if perceptions of audit quality decrease with more 
detailed disclosures. 
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Hypotheses Theory - Effect Result Tests 
  
H1:  Nonprofessional investors will be more confident in the 
accuracy and reliability of the CAM account when the CAM 
account is identified with a detailed disclosure in the auditor’s 
report relative to when a CAM account is identified with a 
generic disclosure. 
Support Theory Supported Table 3 
H2:  Nonprofessional investors will be more confident in the 
accuracy and reliability of the CAM account when the audit 
procedures engaged to address the CAM are disclosed in 
greater detail relative to generic detail. 
Support Theory Supported Table 3 
H3:  Nonprofessional investors will assess audit quality 
higher when the related audit procedures are described with 
greater detail in the auditor’s report relative to when the 
related audit procedures are described with generic detail in 
the auditor’s report.   
Support Theory Supported Table 4 
H4:  Nonprofessional investors will assess financial reporting 
quality as higher when the related audit procedures are 
described in greater detail within the auditor’s report relative 
to when the related audit procedures are described in generic 
detail within the auditor’s report. 
Support Theory Not Supported Table 5 
H5a:  Nonprofessional investors’ confidence in the accuracy 
and reliability of a CAM account will positively mediate the 
relationship between CAM disclosure language and 
assessments of financial reporting quality. 
Support Theory Not Supported* Table 7 
H5b:  Nonprofessional investors’ assessment of audit quality 
will positively mediate the relationship between audit 
procedure disclosure language and assessed financial 
reporting quality. 
Support Theory Not Supported* Table 7 
H6a:  Nonprofessional investors’ confidence in the accuracy 
and reliability of a CAM account will negatively mediate the 
relationship between CAM disclosure language and assessed 
probability of material misstatement. 
Support Theory Supported Table 7 
H6b:  Nonprofessional investors’ assessments of audit quality 
will negatively mediate the relationship between audit 
procedures disclosure language and assessed probability of 
material misstatement. 
Support Theory Not Supported* Table 7 
H7:  Nonprofessional investors’ assessments of financial 
reporting quality will negatively impact their assessed 
misstatement probability. 
Support Theory Not Supported* Table 7 
H8:  Nonprofessional investors’ assessment of misstatement 
probability will negatively impact their decision to invest in 
the target firm and the magnitude of their investment. 
Support Theory Not Supported Figure 5 
            
  
  
* Results are significant but do not conform to 
directional predictions.   
  
      
Figure 10 – Summary of Results
82 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
8.1 Implications 
 The investing public has been lobbying regulators for years to expand the standard 
auditor’s report to create a more informative and useful disclosure.  My experiment examines 
how the principles-based framework of the PCAOB’s re-proposed rule would impact 
nonprofessional investors’ judgments.  It is shown that the expanded disclosures do enter into 
nonprofessional investors’ judgments and that the level of detail present in the disclosure of the 
CAM account and the related audit procedures results in differential judgments.  However, it is 
shown that increased disclosure detail results in higher levels of confidence in the disclosed 
accounts.  Evidence is also provided that more descriptive related audit procedures increase 
nonprofessional investors’ assessments of audit quality.  These findings may provide an 
incentive to auditors to fulfill their regulatory mandate from a information medium perspective 
and disclose detailed information.  As Professor Carcello stated during the IAG’s October 
meeting, if the ultimate result of this new rule is that the audit report again becomes boilerplate, 
the PCAOB should refrain from promulgating a final rule (IAG 2016).  Here, I provide evidence 
that more detailed CAM account disclosures and more detailed related audit procedures result in 
greater confidence in the accuracy and reliability of the disclosed account and higher 
assessments of audit quality.  Further, I provide supplementary evidence that detailed CAM and 
audit procedure disclosures interact to impact nonprofessional investors’ investment decisions. 
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8.2 Limitations 
This research is subject to several limitations.  First, the experimental setting of the 
financial services industry was purposefully selected to make the CAM manipulation more 
uncertain and salient to participants.  The effect of CAM disclosure detail and audit procedure 
detail may not be observed in industries that nonprofessional investors are more familiar with or 
are not native to complex financial transactions and instruments.  Third, the significant main 
effect observed for the inclusion of the CAM on several dependent measures may be an artifact 
of my experimental setting.  Critical audit matters are not presently disclosed in the audit report; 
therefore, the simple appearance of a CAM may itself have been the driving force behind the 
observed effect instead of the content of the critical audit matter itself.  With the literature on 
CAM’s effect on nonprofessional investors’ judgments still in its infancy it is difficult to say 
whether this effect is systematically caused by the inclusion of a CAM or is due to the novel 
nature of not having been exposed to CAMs before this experiment.  Third, the auditor’s report 
was “pushed” to participants in the experimental case, making its contents very salient.  It is 
unknown if the effects observed here would manifest itself in an environment where the auditor’s 
report is contained within several hundred pages of a firm’s annual report and, therefore, less 
salient.  Finally, since the disclosure of a CAM is a novel piece of information, information was 
provided for two companies in the same industry, including the financial statements, notes to the 
financial statements, and the audit reports.  It is unlikely that nonprofessional investors review 
audit reports side-by-side and compare the details of the reports; this would be unsurprising as 
the current audit report is boilerplate and any departures from an unqualified opinion would 
signal dire news.  However, given the PCAOB’s proposal to make the audit report more useful 
and informative, it is not difficult to imagine that investors will now compare the details within 
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the CAMs to other CAMs within an industry when making audit quality and financial reporting 
quality judgments. 
8.3 Future Research 
This paper highlights several opportunities for future research.  First, the detail with 
which the CAM is described is just one factor that may influence nonprofessional investors’ 
judgments.  The sentiment, vividness, and valence of such disclosures may prove to be 
significant determinants of confidence in the financial statements as well.  Second, audit 
procedures may be described in terms other than detailed and generic disclosures.  Future 
research could identify the conditions where audit procedure description significantly impact 
nonprofessional investors’ judgments as well as interact with CAM disclosure.  Third, this paper 
investigates the judgments of one subset of nonprofessional investors.  More or less sophisticated 
nonprofessional investors may exhibit differential judgments in the presence of CAM disclosure 
detail and audit procedure detail.  Finally, while not explicitly required nor prohibited under the 
re-proposed rule, the results of the related audit procedures may end up being disclosed in the 
expanded audit report.  Indeed, there is significant pressure from investors as well as the 
PCAOB’s Investor Advisory Group to disclose this additional information (IAG 2016).  Future 
research could investigate whether disclosing the results of related audit procedures does indeed 
result in differential investing judgments. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A:  Experimental Instrument 
 
Informed Consent 
 
Instructions:     The purpose of this research study is to obtain information about 
nonprofessional investors’ judgments and behavior. You will be asked to assume the role of a 
nonprofessional investor throughout the entire study. You will be asked to read narratives and 
provide your decisions based on the information provided. The information provided in the set of 
materials is intended to be representative rather than complete. Please be sure to base your 
opinions and perceptions only on the information provided in this case. There are no right or 
wrong answers.  Please carefully read all information provided before responding to the 
questions.  For your participation you will receive $2.50 payable to your Amazon Mechanical 
Turk account.   
 
The purpose of this research study is to put you in the role of a nonprofessional investor and to 
gather data about your decisions based on information concerning a firm's financial performance. 
This research study is being conducted via an online instrument presented in a setting of your 
choice that should take approximately 30 minutes to complete.    
 
No identifying information will be used.  In order to meet inclusion criteria for this study, you 
must be at least 18 years of age and have experience investing in individual stocks and reviewing 
financial statements. Physical/mental/health status, gender, occupation, and/or diagnosis are not 
criteria for inclusion in or exclusion from this study.   
 
Your participation is voluntary and your responses will be kept confidential. The person in 
charge of this research study is Peter Kipp and he is called the Principal Investigator. However, 
other research staff may be involved and can act on behalf of the person in charge. This research 
is considered of minimal risk. The risks from participating in this study are not more than would 
be encountered in everyday life. While your participation in this study will help advance the 
body of knowledge regarding nonprofessional investors' judgments, we are unsure if you will 
receive any benefits by taking part in this research study.    
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Your privacy and research records will be kept confidential to the full extent of the 
law.  Authorized research personnel, employees of the Department of Health and Human 
Services, and the USF Institutional Review Board and its staff, and any other individuals acting 
on behalf of USF, may inspect the records from this research project.   
 
You may choose not to participate in this study. Refusal to take part in this study will involve no 
penalty or loss of benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled. You may discontinue 
participation in this study at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you may 
otherwise be entitled.     
 
This study, titled “NonProfessional Investor Judgments” is approved USF IRB # 29477.  If you 
have any questions or concerns about this study, please contact Peter Kipp at 813-974-6863. If 
you have questions about your rights as a participant in this study, general questions, or 
complaints, concerns or issues you want to discuss with someone outside the research study, call 
the Division of Research Integrity and Compliance at the University of South Florida at 813-974-
5638.   By proceeding to the next page, you are agreeing to participate in this study. 
 
<PAGE BREAK> 
  
94 
 
Survey Instructions 
 
On the screens that follow you will be presented with background information, summary 
financial statements, and the independent auditor's report for two companies operating in the 
same industry.  Please pay close attention to the information you are provided.  After reviewing 
the information, you will be asked to compare the two companies on a number of dimensions 
and will be asked to make an investment decision related to the two companies.  Please base your 
responses only on the information contained within the case.  There are no right or wrong 
answers to any of the questions in the case.  While viewing the case materials you may use the 
"Previous" button at the bottom of the screen to return to previous screens and review 
information if necessary.  Please complete the case in a single sitting.  When you are finished, a 
message will appear thanking you for your participation and informing you how to receive your 
compensation. 
 
Case Background Information    
  
The information in this case is prepared following prospective accounting and auditing 
standards, which may differ from current accounting and auditing standards.  Assume that the 
accounting standards are as stated in the case in the event they differ from current 
standards.     For the entirety of this case, please assume the role of an investor who is evaluating 
the 2016 audited financial statements of Aubrek Banking and Bedous Banking.  Both Aubrek 
Banking and Bedous Banking are publicly traded global financial service firms based in New 
York City, NY.  Aubrek Banking and Bedous Banking are competitors and both companies 
provide consumer and commercial banking services, securities brokerage and investment 
banking services, investment advisory services, and venture capital investment services.  Both 
companies are listed on the NASDAQ exchange.  Both Aubrek Banking and Bedous Banking are 
committed to meeting analysts' forecasts and have not missed a forecast target in the past three 
years.  Further, upper management has a large incentive to meet analysts' forecasts because the 
upper management of both companies is compensated almost entirely with bonuses for meeting 
analysts' forecasts.  For the period ending December 31, 2015, the earnings per share (EPS) 
forecast target for both Aubrek Banking and Bedous Banking was $1.42.  You are to evaluate the 
financial position of Aubrek Banking and Bedous Banking using the most recent financial data 
available to you. 
  
If the management of either Aubrek Banking or Bedous Banking were to make an estimate for an 
expense, would it be in the best interest of management to estimate the expense lower or higher? 
 Lower 
 Higher 
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 Assume that Aubrek Banking and Bedous Banking have the audited financial statements 
shown below for the years ended December 31, 2014 and December 31, 2015. 
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Note: Both Aubrek Banking and Bedous Banking were forecasted to report earnings per share (EPS) of $1.42 for the period ending 
December 31, 2015. 
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Please answer the following questions for both Aubrek Banking and 
Bedous Banking.      
 
In your opinion, what is the likelihood (0-100%) that the company's provision for credit losses 
account contains a misstatement that you would consider important? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
Aubrek Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
 
Bedous Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
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In your opinion, what is the likelihood (0-100%) that the company's goodwill impairment 
account contains a misstatement that you would consider important? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Aubrek Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
Bedous Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
 
In your opinion, what is the likelihood (0-100%) that the company's income statement as a 
whole contains a misstatement that you would consider important? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Aubrek Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
Bedous Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
 
In your opinion, what is the likelihood (0-100%) that the company's provision for credit losses 
account contains a misstatement that other investors would consider important? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Aubrek Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
Bedous Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
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In your opinion, what is the likelihood (0-100%) that the company's goodwill impairment 
account contains a misstatement that other investors would consider important? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Aubrek Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
Bedous Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
 
In your opinion, what is the likelihood (0-100%) that the company's income statement as a 
whole contains a misstatement that other investors would consider important? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Aubrek Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
Bedous Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
 
For the next question, please assume that you have $100,000 to invest.  You may choose to 
invest the $100,000 in Aubrek Banking, Bedous Banking, or in any combination of the two 
companies.  However, the TOTAL amount invested must be equal to $100,000.  Please note that 
the sliders may not be moved into a position that totals more than $100,000. 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Investment in Aubrek Banking 
$0     $50,000     $100,000 
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000 
 
Investment in Bedous Banking 
$0     $50,000     $100,000 
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000 
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Background Information 
 
The audit firm for Aubrek Banking is Auldley Hoffman, LLP, a "Big 4" accounting firm that 
employs over 150,000 accountants and staff in 140 countries and is generally accepted to have an 
outstanding reputation for providing assurance on the financial statements of publicly traded 
companies.  The audit firm for Bedous Banking is Darbron Hanks, LLP, another "Big 4" 
accounting firm with attributes similar to those of Auldley Hoffman, LLP.      
 
The standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) require that the 
auditor plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial 
statements are free of material misstatement.      
 
Beginning in 2016, the Independent Auditor's Report contains a section devoted to critical audit 
matters or CAMs.  Critical audit matters, as defined by the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB), are those matters that were identified over the course of the audit by 
the external auditor and: 1) relates to accounts or disclosures that are material to the 
financial statements, and 2) involved the auditor's especially challenging, subjective, or 
complex judgments.        
 
To fully comply with the new PCAOB standard, the auditor is required to describe the audit 
procedures performed to address the critical audit matter during the audit.  The PCAOB 
allows the auditor discretion in how the CAM is described in the audit report and how to 
disclose the audit procedures that were engaged to address the CAM.  Finally, the PCAOB 
standard explicitly states that the inclusion of a CAM in the auditor's report does not in any way 
impact the overall audit opinion on the financial statements or offer a separate level of assurance 
for the CAM account disclosed.      
 
Please open this link to view Auldley Hoffman's Independent Auditor's Report for Aubrek 
Banking and Darbron Hanks' Independent Auditor's Report for Bedous Banking.  Please read 
the information within the audit report carefully as you answer the case questions.  
 
Note: You may keep the tab open to reference the auditor's report as you are answering the case 
questions for your convenience (you will later be asked to close the tab after you have finished 
the case).  You will also find Auldley Hoffman's Independent Auditor's Report for Aubrek 
Banking and Darbron Hanks' Independent Auditor's Report for Bedous Banking on the following 
pages. 
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I have clicked the highlighted link above and have the auditor's reports open in a separate tab. 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
 Yes 
 No 
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Aubrek Banking was issued an unqualified opinion from Auldley Hoffman, LLP for the 
years ending December 31, 2015 and December 31, 2014.  In compliance with Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) auditing standards, the audit report also contained the 
following critical audit matter for the year ending December 31, 2015. 
 
Critical Audit Matters – (Italicized, underlined text included in 
detailed disclosure conditions only) 
    
The critical audit matter communicated below is a matter arising from the current period  audit 
that was communicated or required to be communicated to the audit committee  and that: (1) 
relates to accounts or disclosures that are material to the financial  statements and (2) 
involved our especially challenging, subjective, or complex  judgments. Critical audit matters 
do not alter in any way our opinion on the financial  statements, taken as a whole, and we do not 
provide separate opinions on the critical  audit matters or on the accounts or disclosures to which 
they relate.      
 
Provision for Credit Losses - New Loan Product      
As more fully described in Notes 1 and 7 to the financial statements, during 2015, Aubrek 
Banking began actively marketing a nine-year collateralized loan obligation instrument in 
addition to the three- and five-year collateralized loan obligation instruments historically 
marketed.  At December 31, 2015, the nine-year loans represented approximately 25% of the 
collateralized loan obligation instrument portfolio.  The provision for credit losses is estimated 
by management through the application of judgment and the use of highly subjective 
assumptions.   
 
We determined that the provision for credit losses is a critical audit matter due, in part, to the 
involvement of our complex and subjective judgments in evaluating management's estimates and 
the significance of their judgments.   
 
[Specifically, these estimates and judgments included such items as the limited historical loss 
data for the new loan program, the qualitative adjustments to the model for estimating the 
provision for credit losses, and the sensitivity of the historical loss model to subjective 
estimates, among others.]      
 
Auditor's Response to the Critical Audit Matter      
 
We planned and performed several procedures related to the provision for credit losses for the 
nine-year loans in connection with forming our overall opinion on the financial statements.      
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These procedures included, among other procedures, testing the design and operating 
effectiveness of key controls over the Company’s new model, [including the test of controls over 
the impairment calculation models including data inputs, controls over collateral valuation 
estimates, and governance controls including attending key meetings that form part of the 
approval process for loan impairment provisions].      
 
We compared management’s assumptions for both collective and individual impairment 
allowances to externally available data, [including a critical assessment of management’s 
revisions to estimates and assumptions, specifically in respect of the inputs to the impairment 
models in the commercial and global banking portfolios and the consistency of judgment applied 
in the use of the economic factors, loss emergence periods, and the observation period for 
historical default rates].      
 
Finally, we performed detailed testing on a sample of new and existing models used to calculate 
both unidentified and identified impairment, [including testing of the coding used in the 
impairment models, re-performance of the calculation, testing the extraction of data used in the 
models, and testing and applying sensitivities to the underlying critical assumptions]. 
 
Auldley Hoffman, LLP   
New York City, NY      
March 1, 2016     
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Bedous Banking was issued an unqualified opinion from Darbron Hanks, LLP for the years 
ending December 31, 2015 and December 31, 2014.  In compliance with Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) auditing standards, the audit report also contained the 
following critical audit matter for the year ending December 31, 2015. 
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Critical Audit Matters – (Same across conditions) 
 
The critical audit matter communicated below is a matter arising from the current period  audit 
that was communicated or required to be communicated to the audit committee  and that: (1) 
relates to accounts or disclosures that are material to the financial  statements and (2) 
involved our especially challenging, subjective, or complex  judgments. Critical audit matters 
do not alter in any way our opinion on the financial statements, taken as a whole, and we do not 
provide separate opinions on the critical  audit matters or on the accounts or disclosures to which 
they relate.      
 
Provision for Credit Losses - New Loan Product       
 
As more fully described in Notes 2 and 13 to the financial statements, during 2015, Bedous 
Banking began actively marketing a nine-year collateralized loan obligation instrument in 
addition to the three- and five-year collateralized loan obligation instruments historically 
marketed.  At December 31, 2015, the nine-year loans represented approximately 25% of the 
collateralized loan obligation instrument portfolio.  The provision for credit losses is estimated 
by management through the application of judgment and the use of highly subjective 
assumptions.   
 
We determined that the provision for credit losses is a critical audit matter due, in part, to the 
involvement of our complex and subjective judgments in evaluating management's estimates and 
the significance of their judgments, among other considerations.       
 
Auditor's Response to the Critical Audit Matter      
 
We planned and performed several procedures related to the provision for credit losses for the 
nine-year loans in connection with forming our overall opinion on the financial statements.        
 
These procedures included, among other procedures, testing the design and operating 
effectiveness of key controls over the Company’s new model.       
 
We compared management’s assumptions for both collective and individual impairment 
allowances to externally available data.      
 
Finally, we performed detailed testing on a sample of new and existing models used to calculate 
both unidentified and identified impairment.      
 
Darbron Hanks, LLP   
New York City, NY      
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March 1, 2016     
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<The following was only seen by participants in the Control Condition> 
 
 
Aubrek Banking was issued an unqualified opinion from Auldley Hoffman, LLP for the 
years ending December 31, 2015 and December 31, 2014.  In compliance with Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) auditing standards, the audit report also contained the 
following critical audit matter statement for the year ending December 31, 2015. 
 
Critical Audit Matters       
Critical audit matters are matters arising from the current period audit that  were communicated 
or required to be communicated to the audit  committee and that: (1) relate to accounts or 
disclosures that are material  to the financial statements and (2) involved our especially 
challenging,  subjective, or complex judgments. We determined that there are no critical audit 
matters.     
   
Auldley Hoffman, LLP   
New York City, NY      
March 1, 2016     
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Notes to the Financial Statements (Seen in all conditions) 
Note 7 to the financial statements, referenced in the Auditor's Report for Aubrek Banking, may 
be found below.  Note 1 to the financial statements explains the Company’s Significant 
Accounting Principles, including the Provision for Credit Losses. 
 
NOTE 1. Summary of Significant Accounting Policies 
Provision for Credit Losses  
 
The provision for credit losses, which includes the allowance for loan and lease losses and the 
reserve for unfunded lending commitments, represents management’s estimate of probable losses 
inherent in the Company's lending activities.  The allowance for loan and lease losses represents 
the estimated probable credit losses on funded consumer and commercial loans and leases. 
Lending-related credit exposures deemed to be uncollectible, excluding loans carried at fair 
value, are charged off against these accounts. Write-offs on purchased credit-impaired loans on 
which there is a valuation allowance are recorded against the valuation allowance. Cash 
recovered on previously charged-off amounts is recorded as a recovery to these accounts. 
Management evaluates the adequacy of the provision for credit losses based on the combined 
total of the allowance for loan and lease losses and the reserve for unfunded lending 
commitments.  The Company performs periodic and systematic detailed reviews of its lending 
portfolios to identify credit risks and to assess the overall collectibility of those portfolios.  Loss 
forecast models are utilized for these portfolios which consider a variety of factors including, but 
not limited to, historical loss experience, estimated defaults or foreclosures based on portfolio 
trends, delinquencies, bankruptcies, economic conditions, and credit scores. 
 
NOTE 7. Provision for Credit Losses 
 
In 2015, the Company developed a new nine-year collateralized loan obligation instrument 
representing 25% of our total collateralized loan obligation portfolio.  Due to the nine-year 
instruments possessing characteristics that were similar to our existing three-year and five-year 
collateralized loan obligation instruments, we calculated the provision for the nine-year 
instruments with similar models and estimates. 
 
Note 13 to the financial statements, referenced in the Auditor's Report for Bedous Banking, may 
be found below.  Note 2 to the financial statements explains the Company’s Significant 
Accounting Principles, including the Provision for Credit Losses. 
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NOTE 2. Summary of Significant Accounting Policies 
Provision for Credit Losses 
 
The provision for credit losses, which includes the allowance for loan and lease losses and the 
reserve for unfunded lending commitments, represents management’s estimate of probable losses 
inherent in the Company's lending activities.  The allowance for loan and lease losses represents 
the estimated probable credit losses on funded consumer and commercial loans and leases. 
Lending-related credit exposures deemed to be uncollectible, excluding loans carried at fair 
value, are charged off against these accounts. Write-offs on purchased credit-impaired loans on 
which there is a valuation allowance are recorded against the valuation allowance. Cash 
recovered on previously charged-off amounts is recorded as a recovery to these accounts. 
Management evaluates the adequacy of the provision for credit losses based on the combined 
total of the allowance for loan and lease losses and the reserve for unfunded lending 
commitments.The Company performs periodic and systematic detailed reviews of its lending 
portfolios to identify credit risks and to assess the overall collectibility of those portfolios.  Loss 
forecast models are utilized for these portfolios which consider a variety of factors including, but 
not limited to, historical loss experience, estimated defaults or foreclosures based on portfolio 
trends, delinquencies, bankruptcies, economic conditions, and credit scores. 
 
NOTE 13. Provision for Credit Losses 
 
In 2015, the Company developed a new nine-year collateralized loan obligation instrument 
representing 25% of our total collateralized loan obligation portfolio.  Due to the nine-year 
instruments possessing characteristics that were similar to our existing three-year and five-year 
collateralized loan obligation instruments, we calculated the provision for the nine-year 
instruments with similar models and estimates. 
 
<Page Break> 
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Following are several questions that will ask for your opinion on the information you have just 
reviewed.  You may use the previous button at the bottom of the screen to go back to any of the 
information (e.g. auditor's report, financial statements, notes the financial statements) as you 
answer these questions.  Please carefully read each question and use the financial statements, 
auditor's report, and notes to the financial statements for both firms as you answer each 
question.     
 
If you would like to view the financial statements for Aubrek Banking and Bedous Banking, 
please follow this link and leave the tab open as you answer the case questions.       
 
If you would like to view the notes to the financial statements for Aubrek Banking and Bedous 
Banking, please follow this link and leave the tab open as you answer the case questions.  (Note: 
You will be asked to close all financial statement, notes to the financial statements, and audit 
report tabs before the post experiment questionnaire).      
 
Note:  Any responses you make before you return to a previous page will be saved and can 
be changed before you submit the completed case.      
 
Please be aware that for the following questions you will respond for Aubrek Banking / 
Auldley Hoffman, LLP first and then Bedous Banking / Darbron Hanks, LLP second. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<The following case questions were randomized to control for potential order effects> 
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Reliable information is defined as information that is reasonably free from error and bias 
and faithfully represents what it purports to represent.   
As an investor, how much confidence do you have in the reliability of the values reported 
for the firm's goodwill impairment account specifically? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________   
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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As an investor, how much confidence do you have in the accuracy of the values reported for the 
firm's goodwill impairment account specifically? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
As an investor, how confident are you that the values reported for the firm's goodwill 
impairment account are free from bias? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
114 
 
For this question, select one (1) for Aubrek Banking and select seven (7) for Bedous Banking. 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
For this question, select six (6) for Aubrek Banking and select two (2) for Bedous Banking. 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Reliable information is defined as information that is reasonably free from error and bias 
and faithfully represents what it purports to represent. 
 
As an investor, how much confidence do you have in the reliability of the values reported 
for the firm's provision for credit losses account specifically? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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As an investor, how much confidence do you have in the accuracy of the values reported for the 
firm's provision for credit losses account specifically? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
As an investor, how confident are you that the values reported for the firm's provision for 
credit losses account are free from bias? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Reliable information is defined as information that is reasonably free from error and bias 
and faithfully represents what it purports to represent. 
 
As an investor, how much confidence do you have in the reliability of the values reported 
for the firm's income statement as a whole? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
As an investor, how much confidence do you have in the accuracy of the values reported for the 
firm's income statement as a whole? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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As an investor, how confident are you that the values reported for the firm's income statement 
as a whole are free from bias? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Unconfident 
Unconfident Somewhat 
Unconfident 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
How much do you enjoy eating peanut butter and jelly sandwiches? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Enjoy eating PB&J 
Don’t enjoy 
at all 
  Somewhat 
enjoy 
  Really enjoy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Please indicate your agreement with the following statement:  The 
company's management is competent. 
Aubrek Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
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Please indicate your agreement with the following statement:  The 
company's management is not credible.   
Aubrek Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Please indicate your agreement with the following statement:  The 
company's management is trustworthy. 
Aubrek Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Please indicate your agreement with the following statement:  The 
company's management makes financial reporting choices that are self-serving. 
Aubrek Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Please indicate your agreement with the following statement:  Aubrek Banking's management is 
more credible than Bedous Banking's management. 
Aubrek Banking's Management is more credible than Bedous Banking's Management 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
As an investor, how informative was the disclosure in the audit report that identified the critical 
audit matter? 
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Uninformativ
e 
Uninformativ
e 
Somewhat 
Uninformativ
e 
Neither 
Informative 
nor 
Uninformativ
e 
Somewhat 
Informativ
e 
Informativ
e 
Very 
Informativ
e 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Uninformativ
e 
Uninformativ
e 
Somewhat 
Uninformativ
e 
Neither 
Informative 
nor 
Uninformativ
e 
Somewhat 
Informativ
e 
Informativ
e 
Very 
Informativ
e 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Please indicate your agreement with the following statement:  The auditor did a high quality 
job in identifying the critical audit matter. 
Aubrek Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
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Please indicate your agreement with the following statement:  The auditor's work would allow 
them to accurately identify the critical audit matter while conducting the audit. 
Aubrek Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
As an investor, how independent do you believe the auditor is with respect to the firm's 
management? 
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
NonIndepende
nt 
NonIndepende
nt 
Somewhat 
NonIndepende
nt 
Neither 
Independent 
nor 
NonIndepende
nt 
Somewhat 
Independe
nt 
Independe
nt 
Very 
Independe
nt 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
NonIndepende
nt 
NonIndepende
nt 
Somewhat 
NonIndepende
nt 
Neither 
Independent 
nor 
NonIndepende
nt 
Somewhat 
Independe
nt 
Independe
nt 
Very 
Independe
nt 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
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As an investor, how much effort do you believe the auditor exerted with their audit 
procedures to address the firm's critical audit matter in their audit? 
Aubrek Banking 
Very Small 
Effort 
Small Effort Somewhat 
Small Effort 
Neither a 
Large nor a 
Small Effort 
Somewhat 
Large Effort 
Large Effort Very Large 
Effort 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very Small 
Effort 
Small Effort Somewhat 
Small Effort 
Neither a 
Large nor a 
Small Effort 
Somewhat 
Large Effort 
Large Effort Very Large 
Effort 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
As an investor, how appropriate do you believe the auditor was in their response to address the 
critical audit matter detailed in the audit report for the firm? 
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Inappropriate 
Inappropriate Somewhat 
Inappropriate 
Neither 
Appropriate 
nor 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
Appropriate 
Appropriate Very 
Appropriate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Inappropriate 
Inappropriate Somewhat 
Inappropriate 
Neither 
Appropriate 
nor 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
Appropriate 
Appropriate Very 
Appropriate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
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Please indicate your agreement with the following statement:  The auditor did a high quality 
job in planning and performing the audit procedures that addressed the critical audit matter 
for the firm. 
Aubrek Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
As an investor, how would you assess the overall competence of the auditor and their work? 
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Incompetent 
Incompetent Somewhat 
Incompetent 
Neither 
Competent 
nor 
Incompetent 
Somewhat 
Competent 
Competent Very 
Competent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Incompetent 
Incompetent Somewhat 
Incompetent 
Neither 
Competent 
nor 
Incompetent 
Somewhat 
Competent 
Competent Very 
Competent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
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As an investor, how would you assess the overall quality of the auditor's work? 
Aubrek Banking 
Very Low 
Quality 
Low Quality Somewhat 
Low Quality 
Neither High 
nor Low 
Quality 
Somewhat 
High Quality 
High Quality Very High 
Quality 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very Low 
Quality 
Low Quality Somewhat 
Low Quality 
Neither High 
nor Low 
Quality 
Somewhat 
High Quality 
High Quality Very High 
Quality 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Please indicate your agreement with the following statement:  I believe that the 
auditor conducted a high quality audit of the firm. 
Aubrek Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Please indicate your agreement with the following statement: I believe that the auditors working 
at the auditing firm are competent. 
Aubrek Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
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Please indicate your agreement with the following statement: I agree with the auditor's decision 
to give the firm's financial statements a clean audit opinion. 
Aubrek Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Please indicate your agreement with the following statement: I believe other auditors would 
have given the same audit opinion on the firm's financial statements. 
Aubrek Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Please indicate your agreement with the following statement: The company's financial statements 
as a whole accurately represent their performance. 
Aubrek Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Please indicate your agreement with the following statement: The company's financial 
statements as a whole are reliable. 
Aubrek Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Please indicate your agreement with the following statement: The company's financial 
statements as a whole are biased. 
Aubrek Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
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Please indicate your agreement with the following statement: The company's financial 
statements as a whole are a good indicator of future performance. 
Aubrek Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
In your opinion, how subjective are the amounts reported for the provision for credit losses 
account for the company? 
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Objective 
Objective Somewhat 
Objective 
Neither 
Subjective 
nor 
Objective 
Somewhat 
Subjective 
Subjective Very 
Subjective 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Objective 
Objective Somewhat 
Objective 
Neither 
Subjective 
nor 
Objective 
Somewhat 
Subjective 
Subjective Very 
Subjective 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
In your opinion, how subjective are the amounts reported for the goodwill 
impairment account for the company? 
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Objective 
Objective Somewhat 
Objective 
Neither 
Subjective 
nor 
Objective 
Somewhat 
Subjective 
Subjective Very 
Subjective 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Objective 
Objective Somewhat 
Objective 
Neither 
Subjective 
nor 
Objective 
Somewhat 
Subjective 
Subjective Very 
Subjective 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
In your opinion, how subjective are the amounts reported for the financial statements as a 
whole for the company? 
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Objective 
Objective Somewhat 
Objective 
Neither 
Subjective 
nor 
Objective 
Somewhat 
Subjective 
Subjective Very 
Subjective 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Objective 
Objective Somewhat 
Objective 
Neither 
Subjective 
nor 
Objective 
Somewhat 
Subjective 
Subjective Very 
Subjective 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
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In your opinion, how uncertain are the amounts reported for the provision for credit losses 
account for the company? 
Aubrek Banking 
Very Certain Certain Somewhat 
Certain 
Neither 
Uncertain 
nor Certain 
Somewhat 
Uncertain 
Uncertain Very 
Uncertain 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very Certain Certain Somewhat 
Certain 
Neither 
Uncertain 
nor Certain 
Somewhat 
Uncertain 
Uncertain Very 
Uncertain 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
In your opinion, how uncertain are the amounts reported for the goodwill 
impairment account for the company? 
Aubrek Banking 
Very Certain Certain Somewhat 
Certain 
Neither 
Uncertain 
nor Certain 
Somewhat 
Uncertain 
Uncertain Very 
Uncertain 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very Certain Certain Somewhat 
Certain 
Neither 
Uncertain 
nor Certain 
Somewhat 
Uncertain 
Uncertain Very 
Uncertain 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
In your opinion, how uncertain are the amounts reported for the financial statements as a 
whole for the company? 
Aubrek Banking 
Very Certain Certain Somewhat 
Certain 
Neither 
Uncertain 
nor Certain 
Somewhat 
Uncertain 
Uncertain Very 
Uncertain 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very Certain Certain Somewhat 
Certain 
Neither 
Uncertain 
nor Certain 
Somewhat 
Uncertain 
Uncertain Very 
Uncertain 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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(NOTE:  Question randomization ends here) 
 
In your opinion, what is the likelihood (0-100%) that the company's financial statements contain 
a material misstatement in the provision for credit losses account? 
Aubrek Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
Bedous Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
In your opinion, what is the likelihood (0-100%) that the company's financial statements contain 
a material misstatement in the goodwill impairment account? 
Aubrek Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
Bedous Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
In your opinion, what is the likelihood (0-100%) that the company's financial statements contain 
a material misstatement anywhere in the income statement? 
Aubrek Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
Bedous Banking 
0%     50%     100% 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
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For the next question, please assume that you have $100,000 to invest.  You may choose to 
invest the $100,000 in Aubrek Banking, Bedous Banking, or in any combination of the two 
companies.  However, the TOTAL amount invested must be equal to $100,000.  Please note that 
the sliders may not be moved into a position that totals more than $100,000. 
Investment in Aubrek Banking 
$0     $50,000     $100,000 
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000 
 
Investment in Bedous Banking 
$0     $50,000     $100,000 
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000 
 
<PAGE BREAK> 
  
132 
 
(NOTE:  The following five questions are randomized to control for potential order effects) 
How useful did you find the audit report when making your investment decision? 
Aubrek Banking 
Totally 
Useless 
Useless Somewhat 
Useless 
Neither 
Useful nor 
Useless 
Somewhat 
Useful 
Useful Very Useful 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Totally 
Useless 
Useless Somewhat 
Useless 
Neither 
Useful nor 
Useless 
Somewhat 
Useful 
Useful Very Useful 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
How difficult is it to understand the company's financial statements as a whole? 
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Somewhat 
Difficult 
Neither Easy 
nor Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Somewhat 
Difficult 
Neither Easy 
nor Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
How difficult is it to understand the contents of the company's audit reports? 
Aubrek Banking 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Somewhat 
Difficult 
Neither Easy 
nor Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Bedous Banking 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Somewhat 
Difficult 
Neither Easy 
nor Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
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How difficult is it to compare the financial statements between Aubrek Banking and Bedous 
Banking? 
Financial Statement Comparison 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Somewhat 
Difficult 
Neither Easy 
nor Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
How difficult is it to compare the audit reports between Aubrek Banking and Bedous Banking? 
Audit Report Comparison 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Somewhat 
Difficult 
Neither Easy 
nor Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
(NOTE:  Question randomization ends here) 
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Manipulation Check 
 
Please close all tabs that you have opened with the financial statements, audit reports, or 
notes to the financial statements during this case before proceeding to the Post Experiment 
Questionnaire.  Failure to close all other tabs may invalidate your results and disqualify 
you from receiving compensation. 
 
I confirm that I have closed all tabs that I opened during the experimental case. 
 Yes 
 No 
 
<PAGE BREAK>  
135 
 
Did the auditor identify a critical audit matter in the Independent Auditor's Report of 
Aubrek Banking? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not sure 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Did the auditor identify a critical audit matter in the Independent Auditor's Report of 
Bedous Banking? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not sure 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
What audit opinion did Aubrek Banking receive from Auldley Hoffman, LLP? 
 Unqualified opinion 
 Qualified opinion 
 Adverse opinion 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
What audit opinion did Bedous Banking receive from Darbron Hanks, LLP? 
 Unqualified opinion 
 Qualified opinion 
 Adverse opinion 
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___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Which account did the auditor of Aubrek Banking identify as a critical audit matter? 
 Goodwill Impairment 
 Provision for Credit Losses 
 Depreciation Expense 
 None of the above 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Which account did the auditor of Bedous Banking identify as a critical audit matter? 
 Goodwill Impairment 
 Provision for Credit Losses 
 Depreciation Expense 
 None of the above 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
What level of detail was used to describe the critical audit matter disclosed in the 
independent auditor's report of Aubrek Banking?  (Note:  If there was no critical audit 
matter disclosed for Aubrek Banking please answer 1). 
Level of detail used to describe the critical audit matter in the audit report 
Very Low 
Level of 
Detail 
Low Level of 
Detail 
Somewhat 
Low Level of 
Detail 
Neither a 
Low nor 
High Level 
of Detail 
Somewhat 
High Level 
of Detail 
High Level 
of Detail 
Very High 
Level of 
Detail 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
What level of detail was used to describe the critical audit matter disclosed in the 
independent auditor's report of Bedous Banking?  (Note:  If there was no critical audit 
matter disclosed for Bedous Banking please answer 1). 
Level of detail used to describe the critical audit matter in the audit report 
Very Low 
Level of 
Detail 
Low Level of 
Detail 
Somewhat 
Low Level of 
Detail 
Neither a 
Low nor 
High Level 
of Detail 
Somewhat 
High Level 
of Detail 
High Level 
of Detail 
Very High 
Level of 
Detail 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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What level of detail was used to describe the audit procedures performed to respond to and 
address the disclosed critical audit matter in the independent auditor's report of Aubrek 
Banking?  (Note:  If there was no critical audit matter disclosed for Aubrek Banking please 
answer 1). 
Level of detail used to describe the audit procedures performed 
Very Low 
Level of 
Detail 
Low Level of 
Detail 
Somewhat 
Low Level of 
Detail 
Neither a 
Low nor 
High Level 
of Detail 
Somewhat 
High Level 
of Detail 
High Level 
of Detail 
Very High 
Level of 
Detail 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
What level of detail was used to describe the audit procedures performed to respond to and 
address the disclosed critical audit matter in the independent auditor's report of Bedous 
Banking?  (Note:  If there was no critical audit matter disclosed for Bedous Banking please 
answer 1). 
Level of detail used to describe the audit procedures performed 
Very Low 
Level of 
Detail 
Low Level of 
Detail 
Somewhat 
Low Level of 
Detail 
Neither a 
Low nor 
High Level 
of Detail 
Somewhat 
High Level 
of Detail 
High Level 
of Detail 
Very High 
Level of 
Detail 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Did the presence of a critical audit matter (CAM) in the auditor's report for Aubrek Banking or 
Bedous Banking change the opinion of the auditor? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not sure 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Was Aubrek Banking and Bedous Banking located in a regulated industry or an unregulated 
industry? 
 Regulated industry 
 Unregulated industry 
 Do not recall 
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How difficult did it feel to read the auditor's report for Aubrek Banking? 
Difficulty of Reading 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Somewhat 
Difficult 
Neither Easy 
nor Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
How difficult did it feel to read the auditor's report for Bedous Banking? 
Difficulty of Reading 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Somewhat 
Difficult 
Neither Easy 
nor Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
In your opinion, was the auditor's report for Aubrek Banking more or less difficult to read than 
the auditor's report for Bedous Banking? 
Difficulty of Reading 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Somewhat 
Difficult 
Neither Easy 
nor Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
How difficult did it feel to understand the auditor's report for Aubrek Banking? 
Difficulty of Reading 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Somewhat 
Difficult 
Neither Easy 
nor Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
How difficult did it feel to understand the auditor's report for Bedous Banking?  
Difficulty of Reading 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Somewhat 
Difficult 
Neither Easy 
nor Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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In your opinion, was the auditor's report for Aubrek Banking more or less difficult to 
understand than the auditor's report for Bedous Banking? 
Difficulty of Understanding 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Somewhat 
Difficult 
Neither Easy 
nor Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
How difficult did it feel to process the information in the auditor's report for Aubrek Banking? 
Difficulty of Processing the Information 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Somewhat 
Difficult 
Neither Easy 
nor Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
How difficult did it feel to process the information in the auditor's report for Bedous Banking? 
Difficulty of Processing the Information 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Somewhat 
Difficult 
Neither Easy 
nor Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
In your opinion, was the information in the auditor's report for Aubrek Banking more or 
less difficult to process than the information in the auditor's report for Bedous Banking? 
Difficulty of Processing the Information 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Somewhat 
Difficult 
Neither Easy 
nor Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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___________________________________________________________________________________________  
In your opinion, how much information was contained within the auditor's critical audit matter 
disclosure for Aubrek Banking? 
Information contained within the CAM Disclosure 
Very Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Somewhat 
Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Neither a 
Large nor 
Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Somewhat 
Large 
Amount of 
Information 
Large 
Amount of 
Information 
Very Large 
Amount of 
Information 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
In your opinion, how much information was contained within the auditor's critical audit matter 
disclosure for Bedous Banking? 
Information contained within the CAM Disclosure 
Very Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Somewhat 
Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Neither a 
Large nor 
Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Somewhat 
Large 
Amount of 
Information 
Large 
Amount of 
Information 
Very Large 
Amount of 
Information 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
In your opinion, how much information was contained within the auditor's response to the 
critical audit matter for Aubrek Banking? 
Information contained within the CAM Disclosure 
Very Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Somewhat 
Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Neither a 
Large nor 
Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Somewhat 
Large 
Amount of 
Information 
Large 
Amount of 
Information 
Very Large 
Amount of 
Information 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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In your opinion, how much information was contained within the auditor's response to the 
critical audit matter for Bedous Banking? 
Information contained within the CAM Disclosure 
Very Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Somewhat 
Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Neither a 
Large nor 
Small 
Amount of 
Information 
Somewhat 
Large 
Amount of 
Information 
Large 
Amount of 
Information 
Very Large 
Amount of 
Information 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
In your opinion, did the critical audit matter disclosure for Aubrek Banking contain more 
information than the related notes to the financial statements? 
CAM Disclosure contained less/more information than the Notes to the Financial 
Statements 
Significantly 
Less 
Information 
Less 
Information 
Somewhat 
Less 
Information 
Neither 
More nor 
Less 
Information 
Somewhat 
More 
Information 
More 
Information 
Significantly 
More 
Information 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
In your opinion, did the critical audit matter disclosure for Bedous Banking contain more 
information than the related notes to the financial statements? 
CAM Disclosure contained less/more information than the Notes to the Financial 
Statements 
Significantly 
Less 
Information 
Less 
Information 
Somewhat 
Less 
Information 
Neither 
More nor 
Less 
Information 
Somewhat 
More 
Information 
More 
Information 
Significantly 
More 
Information 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
 
The following questions will assess your familiarity with respect to financial statement audits 
and the auditor.  Please answer the questions without reference to the case you have just 
completed.  Your answers to the following questions will not impact your compensation. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Please state your agreement with the following statement:  The external auditor provides a high 
level of assurance that the financial statements are free of material misstatement. 
Auditor provides a high level of assurance that the F/S are free of material misstatement 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Please state your agreement with the following statement:  The external auditor 
provides absolute assurance and guarantees that the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement. 
Auditor guarantees that the financial statements are free of material misstatement 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Please state your agreement with the following statement:  The external auditor is an objective 
verifier of information provided by management. 
Auditor is an objective verifier of information provided by management 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Please state your agreement with the following statement:  The external auditor is independent 
from the audited company and the company's management. 
Auditor is independent of the company and company's management 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
How familiar are you with the financial statement audit process? 
Familiarity with the Financial Statement Audit Process 
Very 
Unfamiliar 
Unfamiliar Somewhat 
Unfamiliar 
Neither 
Familiar nor 
Unfamiliar 
Somewhat 
Familiar 
Familiar Very 
Familiar 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
How familiar are you with the audit reporting process? 
Familiarity with the Audit Reporting Process 
Very 
Unfamiliar 
Unfamiliar Somewhat 
Unfamiliar 
Neither 
Familiar nor 
Unfamiliar 
Somewhat 
Familiar 
Familiar Very 
Familiar 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
What is your age? 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Are you a native English speaker (e.g. English is your first language or one of your first 
languages)? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
How many years of full-time degree-related professional work experience do you have?  Please 
enter your response in the form of a whole integer. 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Approximately how many times have you analyzed the financial statements of a company (e.g. 
class project, work related assignment, personal investing, etc.)?  Please enter your response in 
the form of a whole integer. 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Have you invested in individual stocks in the past year? 
 Yes 
 No 
 I have invested in individual stocks, but not within the past year. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
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Please select all of the areas in which you have expertise (more than one option may be 
selected).  For this question, please define "expertise" as an area in which you would be 
comfortable applying for a full-time professional position. 
 Finance 
 Accounting 
 Auditing 
 Management 
 Marketing 
 Tax 
 Other 
 None of the above 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
What was the approximate value of your equity holdings as of December 31, 2016? 
 $0 
 $1 - $10,000 
 $10,001 - $20,000 
 $20,001 - $50,000 
 $50,001 - $100,000 
 $100,001 or more 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Approximately how many public company financial statements do you read or refer to during an 
average month? 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Approximately how many public company auditor's reports do you read or refer to during an 
average year? 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
How often do you review the company's financial statements before making an investment 
decision?  Note: 1=Never, 6=Sometimes, 11=Always. 
Frequency of reviewing financial statements before investing 
Never     Sometimes     Always 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
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How often do you review the auditor's report accompanying the financial statements before 
making an investment decision?  Note: 1=Never, 6=Sometimes, 11=Always. 
Frequency of reading audit reports before investing 
Never     Sometimes     Always 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Q43 If you have an undergraduate degree, what was your major field of study?  Note: More than 
one option may be selected. 
 Finance 
 Accounting 
 Auditing 
 Management 
 Marketing 
 Tax 
 Other 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Approximately how many accounting classes have you taken? 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Approximately how many finance classes have you taken? 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Are you currently employed as an external auditor? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Have you ever been employed as an external auditor? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Are you currently employed as an internal auditor? 
 Yes 
 No 
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___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Have you ever been employed as an internal auditor? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
How many individual stock transactions (not mutual funds) do you engage in per year?  (Note: If 
over 500, please enter 500 for this question.) 
Stock Transactions per Year 
0 50 100 150 250 300 350 400 450 500 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
Do you engage in stock transactions as part of your job duties? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
How familiar are you with the financial statement audits of publicly traded companies? 
Familiarity with financial statement audits. 
Very 
Unfamiliar 
Unfamiliar Somewhat 
Unfamiliar 
Neither 
Familiar nor 
Unfamiliar 
Somewhat 
Familiar 
Familiar Very 
Familiar 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
149 
 
Appendix B:  Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables and Covariates 
   
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
   
        
  
  
CAM Detail: Detailed Generic 
  
  
Audit Detail: Detailed Generic Detailed Generic Control Overall 
Variables n=21 n=17 n=17 n=21 n=15 n=76 
     Dependent Measures 
     
  
CAM Accuracy (Aubrek) 3.62 4.00 4.41 4.52 4.64 4.23 
  
  
(1.83) (1.41) (1.50) (1.33) (1.45) (1.54) 
CAM Reliability 
(Aubrek) 3.90 4.53 4.41 4.95 4.64 4.45 
  
  
(1.76) (1.28) (1.50) (1.32) (1.60) (1.52) 
Audit Quality (Aubrek) 5.71 5.62 5.25 5.90 4.60 5.49 
  
  
(0.69) (0.91) (0.97) (0.60) (1.37) (0.99) 
Financial Reporting 
Quality (Aubrek) 4.78 5.20 4.90 5.26 4.99 5.02 
  
  
(1.25) (0.81) (0.98) (0.62) (1.23) (1.00) 
Investment (Aubrek) 56555.86 49007.12 48235.94 51988.57 63449.79 53525.96 
      (13598.23) (10361.08) (8486.66) 
(11054.51
) 
(31249.20
) 
(16385.4
4) 
     Covariate Measures             
CAM Accuracy (Bedous) 3.29 4.00 4.47 4.52 4.14 4.09 
  
  
(1.62) (1.32) (1.50) (1.36) (0.95) (1.45) 
CAM Reliability (Bedous) 3.7143 4.47 4.47 5.05 4.14 4.40 
  
  
(1.62) (1.28) (1.42) (1.32) (1.10) (1.43) 
Audit Quality (Bedous) 5.41 5.64 5.19 5.93 5.27 5.53 
  
  
(0.63) (0.84) (0.93) (0.60) (1.16) (0.86) 
Financial Reporting 
Quality (Bedous) 4.70 5.21 4.87 5.24 4.46 4.90 
  
  
(1.20) (0.80) (0.97) (0.75) (1.18) (1.02) 
Accounting Classes 3.85 4.29 7.59 4.19 3.86 4.69 
  
  
(5.08) (4.82) (6.62) (4.63) (5.48) (5.37) 
Auditor Objectivity 5.86 5.71 5.24 5.86 5.71 5.70 
  
  
(0.73) (1.10) (1.25) (1.39) (1.20) (1.15) 
Audit Report 
Information 4.62 3.47 3.76 4.00 1.57 3.65 
      (1.56) (1.50) (1.48) (1.26) (1.09) (1.69) 
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Appendix C:  IRB Exempt Certification 
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